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Rationing and Disability: The Civil
Rights and Wrongs of State Triage
Protocols
Deborah Hellman* and Kate M. Nicholson**
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic and the unprecedented natural
disasters of 2020 remind us of the importance of emergency
preparedness. This Article contributes to our legal and ethical
readiness by examining state “Crisis Standards of Care,” which
are the standards that determine how medical resources are
allocated in times of scarcity. The Article identifies a flaw in the
policy choice at the heart of the standards: the standards focus
on saving as many lives as possible but, in so doing, will
predictably disadvantage the ability of people with disabilities
and racial minorities to access life-saving care.
To date, scholarly attention has focused on explicit
exclusions of people with particular medical conditions or the
standards’ failure to be sufficiently individualized. Amending
the protocols to address these concerns, while important, will
simply tinker at the margins. The more consequential and
* David Lurton Massee, Jr. Professor of Law and F. Palmer Weber
Research Professor of Civil Liberties and Human Rights at the University of
Virginia School of Law. Both authors would like to thank Samuel Bagenstos,
Alexander Boni Saenz, Molly Brady, Doron Dorfman, Elizabeth Emens, Trudo
Lemmens, Ari Ne’eman, Govind Persad, David Wasserman, the participants
in the 2020–2021 Virtual Health Law workshop and participants at the
ASLME’s 44th Annual Health Law Professor’s Conference for their comments
and suggestions, and Leslie Ashbrook, Kathryn Boudouris, Ben Doherty,
Peyton Pair, and Savanna Williams for their excellent research assistance.
** President and founder, National Pain Advocacy Center; civil rights
attorney, formerly with the U.S. Department of Justice; and a primary drafter
of the current regulations under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

1207

1208

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207 (2021)

harder question is how states should balance the demand to save
as many lives as possible while also ensuring that people with
disabilities and other vulnerable groups are treated fairly.
To answer that question, this Article distills and analyzes
four rationing principles that animate the state standards and
contends that none ultimately balances these two important aims
in a manner consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and the moral commitments on which it rests. It thus
provides a moral and legal framework to guide the ongoing
revision of the standards. The Article concludes by proposing a
novel, alternative rationing system that reserves resources to
accommodate both efficiency and equity, thereby better
instantiating the balance that undergirds the ADA.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance
of emergency preparedness. As we have learned, being prepared
means having adequate supplies of medical resources, sufficient
medical personnel, and ample space in hospitals. In addition, to
address both the current pandemic and the next emergency, we
need up-to-date systems for tracking disease, analyzing data,
and distributing goods and services. But emergency
preparedness is more than an issue of supplies, personnel, and
systems; it also requires that the legal and ethical tools we bring
to bear to address crises are justified and consistent with
relevant law.
Among such tools are the state “Crisis Standards of Care”
that direct how scarce medical resources should be allocated
when supply is insufficient to meet the need. Many of these
Crisis Standards were written well in advance of the current
pandemic. New York, for example, drafted its comprehensive
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“Ventilator Allocation Guidelines” in 2015.1 However, since the
pandemic’s onset, a large number of states have modified their
protocols2 or adopted new ones entirely.3 In this domain as in
others, we were not fully ready.
A central feature of the Crisis Standards of Care that were
in place when the pandemic hit was a near singular focus on
saving the most lives possible.4 While this goal seems
reasonable, in practice, the rationing principles needed to
achieve it will negatively and disproportionately affect the
ability of people with disabilities5 to get access to life-saving
care.6 This problem is not merely hypothetical. As of this
writing, at least four states—Arizona, New Mexico, Alaska, and
Idaho—in addition to Washington, D.C. have activated their
crisis standards.7 Moreover, even if, or when, the crisis is not
1. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & LAW, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH,
VENTILATOR ALLOCATION GUIDELINES (2015) [hereinafter N.Y. VENTILATOR
GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/248A-KABV (PDF).
2.
See, e.g., MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, PATIENT CARE STRATEGIES FOR
SCARCE RESOURCE OPERATIONS (2020) [hereinafter MINNESOTA GUIDELINES],
https://perma.cc/2RYD-6Z24 (PDF) (revising the State of Minnesota’s Crisis
Standards of Care in response to the COVID-19 pandemic); UTAH DEP’T OF
HEALTH ET AL., UTAH CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE GUIDELINES (2020)
[hereinafter UTAH GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/UH3Z-NKHR (PDF)
(updating the previous Crisis Standards of Care from 2010).
3. See, e.g., IDAHO DEP’T OF HEALTH & WELFARE, PATIENT CARE:
STRATEGIES FOR SCARCE RESOURCE SITUATIONS (2020) [hereinafter IDAHO
GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/5WXT-BJL8 (PDF); MASS. EXEC. OFF. OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE,
PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC (Oct. 2020) [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/3XX2-7SYG (PDF).
4. See N.Y. VENTILATOR GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 4 (“The primary
goal of the Guidelines is to save the most lives in an influenza pandemic where
there are a limited number of available ventilators.”).
5. We refer generically to individuals with disabilities throughout this
Article, by which we mean any individual with a pre-existing condition that
would be considered a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Of course,
many people may become disabled from the coronavirus disease or its
consequences, but where rationing decisions are made at the onset, it is
existing disabilities that inform our inquiry.
6. As we discuss in Part II, the ADA and the related civil rights laws
prohibit facially-neutral policies that have the effect of discriminating on the
basis of disability. See infra notes 107 and 109 and accompanying text.
7. See ARIZ. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., COVID-19 PANDEMIC: CRISIS
STANDARDS OF CARE ACTIVATION RECOMMENDATION FROM STATE DISASTER
MEDICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE (SDMAC) AND ADHS FINAL DETERMINATION 4
(2020), https://perma.cc/DN63-L4UB (PDF) (recommending that Arizona
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acute, the prospect of the implementation of these standards
means that people from vulnerable groups are left to grapple
with the anxiety that, should they require hospitalization, they
may be denied access to life-saving care.
The Crisis Standards of Care thus raise significant legal
and moral issues. In particular, many may violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)8 and related civil rights
laws,9 and the moral commitment to equal worth on which those
laws rest. Unsurprisingly, in the early days of the pandemic,
disability rights advocates raised challenges to these protocols
in complaints to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) at the
Department of Health and Human Services.10 And OCR quickly
hospitals implement the state’s Crisis Standards of Care policy); N.M. DEP’T
HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY ORDER RECOGNIZING THE ACTIVATION
CRISIS CARE STANDARDS 2 (2020), https://perma.cc/BE3T-ASMZ (PDF)
(ordering that certain healthcare professionals be credentialed under
procedures outlined in the Crisis Standards of Care during the COVID-19
pandemic); D.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH, AUTHORIZATION OF USE OF CRISIS STANDARDS
OF CARE BY HEALTHCARE FACILITIES DURING THE COVID-19 DECLARED
EMERGENCY 1–2 (2020), https://perma.cc/R2GM-23VQ (PDF) (authorizing the
implementation of D.C.’s Crisis Standards of Care based on findings that the
COVID-19 pandemic is overwhelming healthcare providers); see also ALASKA
DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., ACTIVATION OF STATE PATIENT CARE
STRATEGIES FOR SCARCE RESOURCE SITUATIONS (2021), https://perma.cc/L25LBBVU (PDF); IDAHO DEP’T OF HEALTH & WELFARE, DECLARATION OF CRISIS
STANDARDS OF CARE (2021), https://perma.cc/7ABU-5ACU (PDF).
8. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 and 47 U.S.C.).
9. Almost all healthcare decision-makers are covered by: the ADA; § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and/or § 1557 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. § 18116. These laws
contain analogous general prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of
disability, but § 504 and the ADA are much more detailed. Section 504 is the
precursor to the ADA, which applies to those receiving federal financial
assistance and federal contractors. The ADA provides that nothing is to apply
a lesser standard than the standards articulated under § 504. See 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35 (2019) (articulating the specific prohibitions provided under § 504).
10. For complaints against Washington, Alabama, Tennessee, Utah,
Oklahoma, North Carolina, Oregon, Arizona, Nebraska, and North Texas
protocols, see HHS-OCR Complaints Re COVID-19 Medical Discrimination,
ARC (Mar. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/S4W6-66V7. OCR has already resolved
complaints against Alabama, Tennessee, and Utah. See Press Release, OCR,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., OCR Reaches Early Case Resolution with
Alabama After It Removes Discriminatory Ventilator Triaging Guidelines
(Apr. 8, 2020) [hereinafter OCR HHS Press Release Alabama],
https://perma.cc/T7CK-2VJB (PDF) (announcing the end of a compliance
review of the State of Alabama in response to claims that Alabama’s Crisis
OF
OF
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responded with a statement reaffirming that any rationing must
be undertaken in a way that protects the basic civil rights of
people with disabilities.11 More recently, a small number of the
states that have revised or adopted new protocols have
recognized, at least in principle, that the goal of saving the most
lives possible must be modified to take account of how that aim
impacts vulnerable groups.12 Oregon, which is perhaps at the
forefront of this shift in perspective, even goes so far as to
suggest that the traditional focus in triage standards on saving
the most lives possible is flawed because it “may lead to further
Standards of Care impermissibility discriminated on the basis of age and
disability status); Press Release, OCR, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
OCR Resolves Complaint with Tennessee After It Revises Its Triage Plans to
Protect Against Disability Discrimination (June 26, 2020) [hereinafter OCR
HHS Press Release Tennessee], https://perma.cc/U65S-GARV (PDF)
(documenting the various changes Tennessee made to its crisis standards of
care, including eliminating life expectancy as a factor in allocating scarce
medical resources); Sheri Fink, Who Gets Lifesaving Care? Tennessee Changes
Rules After Federal Complaint, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2020),
https://perma.cc/CCM8-K6W6; Press Release, OCR, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., OCR Resolves Complaint Against Utah After It Revised Crisis
Standards of Care to Protect Against Age and Disability Discrimination (Aug.
20, 2020) [hereinafter OCR HHS Press Release Utah], https://perma.cc/7FEX7ZSJ. As discussed in Part III, the complaint lodged in Utah focused not only
on explicit discrimination but also on assessment tools that deprioritize people
with disabilities, or the sort of disparate impact discrimination we address in
this Article.
11. See OCR, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., BULLETIN: CIVIL
RIGHTS, HIPAA, AND THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) (2020)
[hereinafter OCR HHS Bulletin], https://perma.cc/XXU5-T4QZ (PDF) (“In this
time of emergency, the laudable goal of providing care quickly and efficiently
must be guided by the fundamental principles of fairness, equality, and
compassion that animate our civil rights laws.”); Press Release, OCR, U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., OCR Issues Bulletin on Civil Rights Laws and
HIPAA Flexibilities That Apply During the COVID-19 Emergency (Mar. 28,
2020), https://perma.cc/FQ3J-K9S3 (announcing the release of the OCR HHS
Bulletin, which reaffirms healthcare providers’ legal and regulatory
obligations not to discriminate on the basis of disability during the COVID-19
pandemic); Sheri Fink, U.S. Civil Rights Office Rejects Rationing Medical Care
Based on Disability, Age, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/E66G3B7R (last updated Mar. 30, 2020) (documenting the various civil rights
complaints filed by the Department of Health and Human Services to ensure
that healthcare providers are not violating individual civil rights when
providing services).
12. See, e.g., OR. HEALTH AUTH., PRINCIPLES IN PROMOTING HEALTH
EQUITY DURING RESOURCE CONSTRAINED EVENTS 3 (Dec. 7, 2020) [hereinafter
OREGON PRINCIPLES], https://perma.cc/24VY-GQ3A (PDF).
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inequitable access to life-saving resources and health
inequalities.”13
While it is not yet clear whether these developments augur
a trend away from the singular focus on saving the most lives
possible, they demonstrate a renewed interest in the important
and pressing question of how to allocate scarce medical
resources in times of emergency. Should the focus be exclusively
on saving the most lives possible? Or should that laudable and
important aim be balanced with the goal of ensuring access for
people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups? This
Article takes up that question.
The complaints already lodged14 and the legal scholarship
to date15 focus chiefly on a narrow problem with the state
protocols: some expressly exclude people with particular
disabilities from treatment.16 While we agree that protocols
which expressly single out specific disabilities as a basis for
denying care are inherently problematic, our focus is elsewhere.
We address the more difficult question raised by facially neutral
rationing policies that will save lives but, at the same time, will
disproportionately exclude people with disabilities from care.
The resolution of this dilemma is likely to be extremely
consequential.17 While a relatively small number of people are
left out by the explicit exclusions that have now been removed
from some state protocols, the policy choice to aim exclusively at
saving the most lives will deprioritize large numbers of people

13. Id.
14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators
from COVID-19 Patients with Pre-Existing Disabilities? Notes on the Law and
Ethics of Disability-Based Medical Rationing, 130 YALE L.J. F. 1, 3–4 (2020)
[hereinafter Bagenstos, May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators] (arguing that
disability discrimination present in Crisis Standards of Care protocols is a
violation of the law); see also Govind Persad, Disability Law and the Case for
Evidence-Based Triage in a Pandemic, 130 YALE L.J.F. 26, 34–35 (2020) (“It is
plausible—though contestable—that decisions about which patients will
receive scarce medical treatments are governed by disability discrimination
law.”).
16. See Bagenstos, May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators, supra note 15, at
2 (discussing the disability-based distinctions that Crisis Standards of Care
make when determining who receives live-saving treatments during a period
of increased demand).
17. See infra Part II.
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whose prior health status augurs a poor prognosis.18 This Article
thus addresses the central moral and legal choice that lies at the
heart of the rationing protocols.
Importantly, there is a significant overlap between the
groups defined as people with disabilities and racial minority
groups.19 Indeed, COVID-19 has had such a significant
disparate impact on African-American, Native American, and
Latinx people at least in part because individuals within these
groups have health conditions, including conditions that are
disabilities under the law, that make them more vulnerable to
bad outcomes from this disease.20 So while we focus on the
common ground of disability, and evaluate whether the fact that
these protocols negatively affect access to health care for people
with existing disabilities violates current law, it is important to
note that this negative effect will also fall especially heavily on
racial minorities.21
Even in cases where no rationing occurs, the choices
reflected in emergency preparedness protocols matter. The
existence and endorsement of these policies sends a message to
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See Rashmi Goyat et al., Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Disability
Prevalence, 3 J. RACIAL & ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES 635, 641 (2016) (“A
significantly higher percentage of non-Hispanic African Americans (14.8%)
than non-Hispanic Whites (10.2%) had severe disability; the rates for Latinos
were 8.1%.”); Martha Ross & Nicole Bateman, Disability Rates Among
Working-Age Adults Are Shaped by Race, Place, and Education, BROOKINGS
(May 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/5THG-X995 (“At the national level, Native
Americans have the highest disability rate among working-age adults (16
percent), followed by blacks (11 percent), whites (9 percent), Hispanics (7
percent), and Asians (4 percent).”).
20. See Kamyar Arasteh, Prevalence of Comorbidities and Risks
Associated with COVID-19 Among Black and Hispanic Populations in New
York City: An Examination of the 2018 New York City Community Health
Survey, 8 J. RACIAL & ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES 863, 863 (2020) (concluding
that “[t]he greater prevalence of the factors associated with COVID-19
infection and adverse outcomes puts Black and Hispanic populations in NYC
at a greater risk. These factors are also related to poverty and should be
mitigated together with reducing racial/ethnic inequities”).
21. For a brief history of intersectionality and disability, see Rabia Belt
& Doron Dorfman, Disability, Law, and the Humanities: The Rise of Disability
Legal Studies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF L. & HUMAN. 145 (Simon Stern et al.,
eds., 2019). See NATALIE M. CHIN ET AL., EXAMINING HOW CRISIS STANDARDS OF
CARE MAY LEAD TO INTERSECTIONAL MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
COVID-19 PATIENTS, https://perma.cc/V3MW-XKUA (PDF), for more on the
intersectional problem of medical discrimination in the COVID-19 pandemic.
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people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups that their
lives are less important than others or that the hard-won
achievement of legal protections that ensure that they are
treated equally is fragile and easily overridden in difficult
times.22
To be sure, the decisions required in times of scarcity are
not simple. We appreciate the “hard choices” these protocols
require. Our aim is to illustrate in an accessible manner exactly
what principles state crisis standards embody, and to examine
these principles, both legally and morally. This is especially
important because these protocols are in flux, as modifications
are emerging in real time23 and states have announced
intentions to revisit these questions while they continue to plan
for this pandemic and future crises.24 In this potentially
transitional moment, the singular focus on saving the most lives
possible is starting to be reexamined and contested.
In the end, we argue that the best understanding of existing
law, as well as the most morally defensible option, would require
modification of most state protocols.25 In our view, the
traditional prioritization of saving the most lives is flawed, and
the experience of the current pandemic demonstrates the need
to revise the protocols so that this goal is pursued within a
framework that also ensures that people with disabilities and
members of other vulnerable groups are not left out.26 We
conclude by offering those involved in future emergency
planning a novel, systemic solution for balancing both goals.27

22.
23.

See infra Part II.E.3.
See N.J. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ALLOCATION OF CRITICAL CARE RESOURCES
DURING A PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY 1 (2020) [hereinafter N.J. GUIDELINES],
https://perma.cc/DBH7-WCVB (PDF) (revising the previous Crisis Standards
of Care with the understanding that they are subject to change at any time);
OREGON PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 1 (issuing an interim statement
following the Oregon Health Authority’s September 2020 “decision to no longer
reference or depend on previously established guidance, due to its potential for
perpetuating discrimination and health inequities”).
24. See OREGON PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 1 (stating that the Oregon
Health Authority “has begun meetings with community partners and health
care experts in order to co-create a new and inclusive process with the goal of
developing revised crisis care guidance centered on health equity”).
25. See infra Part IV.B.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.A.
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The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we lay out four
hypothetical principles for rationing scarce medical resources
and describe the ways in which the current state protocols rest
on these rationing principles. Part II provides the legal
background for our discussion. It addresses how the ADA and
other discrimination laws bear on the legal permissibility of the
state standards. Part III contains the heart of our analysis.
There, we examine the permissibility of each of the four
rationing principles and conclude that all are problematic and
thus in need of revision. Finally, Part IV offers a novel proposal
for how state protocols should be amended to take account of
both the understandable desire to save as many people as
possible and the imperative to ensure that in doing so people
with disabilities and other vulnerable groups have a fair chance
to access life-saving care. A conclusion follows.
I.

RATIONING PRINCIPLES
A.

In Theory

Imagine that medical resources are scarce. How should a
state or hospital determine who gets access to these resources?
Which aims or principles ought to inform their decisions? In any
rationing situation, there will be many possibilities.28 For
example, the familiar (if outdated), “women and children first”
principle that guided who got the limited lifeboat spots on the
Titanic rests on the combination of two rationing principles: (1)
women should be preferred to men; and (2) children should be
preferred over adults. Today, sex-based rationing is unlikely to
be adopted but age-based rationing—especially when it provides
a preference for children—is one possible approach.29
To make concrete and accessible the choices that
policymakers face in designing protocols to guide the rationing
of scarce medical resources, we offer four hypothetical principles
illustrated in the stylized scenarios below. In these scenarios,
we focus on a generic “scarce medical resource” or SMR, because
28.
See generally Saul Smilansky, A Hostage Situation, 116 J. PHIL. 447
(2019) (cataloging the many principles that could plausibly apply to rationing
of a scarce life-saving resource and arguing that several among them are
morally permissible).
29. See infra Part III.B.

RATIONING AND DISABILITY

1217

which resource or resources will become scarce in any crisis is
difficult to predict in advance. In the spring of 2020, ventilators
were scarce.30 As we write, scarcity of hospital beds and trained
medical personnel is limiting care.31 In the future, the scarce
resource might be a medicine, a device, or something else that
we cannot now imagine. But what we can imagine, and prepare
for, are the principles that could be brought to bear in
determining how society addresses this scarcity. Four possible
rationing principles follow:
Scenario One: Probability of Survival
Suppose that Patient A has an X probability of surviving
after treatment with the SMR while Patient B has a .5X
probability of survival after treatment.
Principle One: A rationing principle based on Probability of
Survival would prioritize A over B because A has a greater
likelihood of surviving treatment.
Scenario Two: Level of Resource Commitment
Suppose that Patient C requires Y units of time with the
SMR to recover while Patient D requires four times that amount
to achieve the same result.
Principle Two: A rationing principle based on Level of
Resource Commitment would prioritize C over D because C will
use the resource for less time than would D.
Scenario Three: Life Expectancy
Suppose that Patient E and Patient F have the same
probability of survival after treatment for the same amount of
time, but that Patient E has a life expectancy of twenty years
after treatment while Patient F has a life expectancy of five
years after treatment.
Principle Three: A rationing principle based on Life
Expectancy would prioritize E over F because E has a longer life
expectancy after treatment.
Scenario Four: Quality of Life

30. See Sarah Kliff et al., There Aren’t Enough Ventilators to Cope with
the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/7W97-L38U
(last updated Mar. 26, 2020) (discussing the worldwide shortage of ventilators
during the COVID-19 pandemic).
31. See Reed Abelson, Covid Overload: U.S. Hospitals Are Running Out
of Beds for Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/CK3U-DE6Q
(documenting various consequences of a nationwide shortage of healthcare
personnel and the shortage’s effect on non-COVID-19 patients).
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Suppose that Patient G and Patient H have the same
likelihood of survival after treatment with the SMR for the same
amount of time and are likely to survive for the same number of
years after treatment. However, G will have “a higher quality of
life” than will H.
Principle Four: A rationing principle based on perceived
Quality of Life would prioritize G over H because G is perceived
to have a better quality of life.
These examples, while stripped down and stylized, employ
factors that are commonly used in the state protocols.32 The
factors could easily be combined. We present them separately to
explore whether each principle is morally and legally
permissible and if not, why not. In the next section we show how
each of these principles operates in state protocols.
B.

In Practice

In this section, we provide an overview of key aspects of the
state “Crisis Standards of Care.” The overarching aim of the
state protocols is to save the most lives.33 For example, the
University of Washington, which drafted a new document
specifically focused on allocating scarce resources in light of
COVID-19 in the early days of the pandemic, provides that “the
standard construct for medical resource allocation in time of
scarcity is based upon a utilitarian framework, often stated as
making decisions that provide the greatest good for the greatest
number.”34 Similarly, New York’s “Ventilator Allocation
Guidelines,” which were issued in 2015 in anticipation of a
possible influenza pandemic, provide that “[t]he primary
goal . . . is to save the most lives in an influenza pandemic where
there are a limited number of available ventilators.”35 Today,
32. See infra Part II.
33. See Katie Savin & Laura Guidry-Grimes, Confronting Disability
Discrimination During the Pandemic, HASTINGS CTR. (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://perma.cc/6E3L-7HRY (advancing recommendations to change crisis
triage protocols to minimize structural disability discrimination).
34.
UNIV. WASH. MED. CTR., MATERIAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES
AND GUIDELINES: COVID-19 OUTBREAK 1 [hereinafter U. WASH. ALLOCATION
PRINCIPLES], https://perma.cc/HC4N-3LMY (PDF).
35. N.Y. VENTILATOR GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 4; see MASSACHUSETTS
GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 12 (articulating the general understanding that
the purpose of the Guidelines is to save the most lives as possible); KY. PUB.
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the picture is somewhat murkier, as a few states have updated
their protocols to articulate, at least in principle, a desire for
greater balancing of the goals of saving lives and ensuring
inclusion.36
The approach of saving the most lives is described in the
Crisis Standards of Care as “utilitarian” in orientation.37
However, several different ethical theories could, and do,
support the importance of saving as many lives as possible.38 We
use the term “utility” as shorthand because it is the term used
by the protocols, but our intention is simply to ask whether the
exclusive aim of maximizing the number of lives saved comports
with ethical norms and existing law.
To get a handle on precisely how the state crisis standards
of care implement this maximizing-lives-saved approach and to
HEALTH, CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE: GUIDANCE FOR THE ETHICAL ALLOCATION
OF SCARCE RESOURCES DURING A COMMUNITY-WIDE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
35 (2020) [hereinafter KENTUCKY GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/PJH5-GXDX
(PDF) (describing the Kentucky Department of Public Health’s duty as a
“charge to do the best for the most, saving as many lives as possible with a
marked scarcity of resources”).
36. As we observed in the Introduction, most notable in this regard is an
action taken by the Oregon Health Authority to rescind its previous crisis
standards. See OREGON PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 3 (issuing a statement of
principles and announcing the intention to revise its standards going forward,
while noting that “[t]he primary goal of crisis care guidance has traditionally
been to save the most lives” with insufficient consideration of health equity
and nondiscrimination). Similarly, New Jersey, which revised its protocol in
December 2020, reframes its animating principle as one obtaining “maximum
benefit for populations of patients, often expressed as doing the greatest good
for the greatest number, while promoting just distribution of benefits,
burdens, and costs.” N.J. GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 3. The protocol that
operationalizes this principle, however, continues to ration on the basis of
principles which we would reject as giving insufficient credence to inclusivity
and distributive concerns.
37.
See N.J. GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 4 (“Any allocation system
should be equitable (fair) and serve to maximize lives and life-years saved
(utility).”); R.I. DEP’T OF HEALTH, CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE GUIDELINES 5–6
(2020) [hereinafter R.I. GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/CKR9-LT7X (PDF)
(noting that healthcare institutions’ duty to steward resources reflects “the
utilitarian goal of saving the greatest possible number of lives”); U. WASH.
ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES, supra note 34, at 1 (stating that scarce medical
resource allocation typically “is based upon a utilitarian framework, often
stated as making decisions that provide the greatest good for the greatest
number,” while “[g]reatest good . . . is generally considered maximizing
survival of patients”).
38. See generally Smilansky, supra note 28.
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generate the ethical questions our scenarios explore, we describe
how each of these “hypothetical” rationing principles are
instantiated in the state protocols.
1.

Principle One: Probability of Survival

State standards operationalize the goal of saving the most
lives by prioritizing people who can derive the most benefit from
scarce medical resources. For example, New Jersey’s standards
provide that “[p]atients who are more likely to survive with
intensive/critical care are prioritized over patients who are less
likely to survive with intensive care/critical care.”39 In practice,
this means that patients are ranked in terms of their likelihood
of survival with treatment and the patients in need of treatment
who are most likely to benefit from it are offered treatment first.
In Pennsylvania, patients are divided into color coded categories
and the protocol directs that “individuals in the red group have
the best chance to benefit from critical care interventions and
should therefore receive priority over all other groups in the face
of scarcity.”40 This approach rations scarce medical resources
based on Probability of Survival, Principle One in our
scenarios.41
Most states measure probability of survival using a metric
called a “SOFA” score, which many jurisdictions see as a proxy

39.
40.

N.J. GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 8.
See PA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, INTERIM PENNSYLVANIA CRISIS STANDARDS OF
CARE FOR PANDEMIC GUIDELINES 31 (2020) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA
GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/TD2N-HP5T (PDF)
[I]ndividuals in the red group have the best chance to benefit from
critical care interventions and should therefore receive priority over
all other groups in the face of scarcity. The orange group has
intermediate priority and should receive critical care resources if
there are available resources after all patients in the red group have
been allocated critical care resources. The yellow group has lowest
priority and should receive critical care resources if there are
available resources after all patients in the red and orange groups
have been allocated critical care resources.
Accord N.Y. VENTILATOR GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 6–7 (assigning patients
color codes to determine the level of access to a ventilator with blue-code
patients representing the lowest access and red-code patients representing the
highest access).
41. See supra Part I.A.
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for mortality risk.42 SOFA is an acronym for “Sequential Organ
Failure Assessment” and works as follows:
The SOFA score adds points based on clinical measures of
function in six key organs and systems: lungs, liver, brain,
kidneys, blood clotting, and blood pressure. For each
variable, dysfunction is measured on a zero to four scale,
with four being the worst score. A perfect SOFA score,
indicating normal function in all six categories, is 0; the
worst possible score is 24 and indicates life-threatening
abnormalities in all six systems.43

The value of SOFA scores is consistency.44 Rather than relying
on subjective judgments of prognosis, clinicians must assess
each organ or system and tally points in a standard way.45 Some
states, like Vermont, use a Modified Sequential Organ Failure
Assessment (mSOFA).46 Other states, like Tennessee, provide
for use of either SOFA or mSOFA assessments.47 Both tests
operate in a similar manner.48

42. See, e.g., KENTUCKY GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 35 (using patients’
SOFA scores to determine “those who are too ill to likely survive”); N.J.
GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at 7 (“[T]he Sequential Organ Failure Assessment
(SOFA) score . . . is used to determine patients’ prognoses for hospital
survival.”); R.I. GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 17–18 (“The most common triage
tool of survivability for adults is the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment
(SOFA) tool.”).
43. N.Y. VENTILATOR GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 49–50.
44. See, e.g., id. at 52 (rationalizing the use of SOFA scores for clinical
ventilator allocation protocol because “clinical criteria to support triage
decisions promote fairness and consistency, as well as provide clinicians with
guidance to follow when they are faced with this difficult situation”).
45. See, e.g., id. at 14 (“A SOFA score adds points based on clinical
measures of function in six key organs and systems: lungs, liver, brain,
kidneys, blood clotting, and blood pressure.”).
46. See VT. DEP’T OF HEALTH, VERMONT CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE PLAN
47–48 (2020), https://perma.cc/RR3N-JYRU (PDF) (describing the mSOFA
Scores as a “quantitative and qualitative decision-making” guideline for the
“Ethical Allocation of Scarce Mechanical Ventilators”).
47. See TENN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, GUIDANCE FOR THE ETHICAL ALLOCATION
OF SCARCE RESOURCES DURING A COMMUNITY-WIDE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
AS DECLARED BY THE GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE B-3 (2020) [hereinafter
TENNESSEE GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/S5LF-VQKV (PDF) (allowing
hospitals to use “the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) Score or
the Modified-SOFA (MSOFA)” to determine patients’ likelihood of survival).
48. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the use of SOFA requires additional
blood tests while the mSOFA only requires creatine measurement, but that
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In some states, evaluation using a SOFA-type scale is only
the first step, and additional factors, such as whether the
patient presents with an underlying co-morbid condition, or
disability, is used as a proxy for probability of survival.49 Still
other state protocols use general descriptions of likelihood to
benefit from treatment as a factor for prioritizing access to
life-saving care.50 All of these considerations relate to
Probability of Survival.
2.

Principle Two: Level of Resource Commitment

Some states expressly use Level of Resource Commitment as
a prioritization factor when deciding whether to allocate a scarce
medical resource.51 In Alaska, for example, those patients likely
to use a resource for fewer than three days and those likely to
improve with access to the resource are assigned a higher
priority than those likely to use it for more than seven days.52
“[t]he cutoffs remain the same using either score, and the prediction for both
is essentially the same”).
49. See, e.g., MINNESOTA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 6-2 (“SOFA scores
should never be used to deny a ventilator to a patient but should be used in
combination with other factors to compare patients needing the resource.”);
OKLA. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, HOSPITAL CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE 14 (2020)
[hereinafter OKLAHOMA GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/PS3M-R5CS (PDF)
(combining a patient’s SOFA score, their “prognosis for short-term survival,”
and their “[p]rognosis for long-term survival” to assign a level of priority for
allocation of scarce resources).
50. See, e.g., ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, GUIDELINES ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS FOR HOSPITALS DURING COVID-19 7 [hereinafter ILLINOIS
GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/QBN3-STXB (PDF) (allowing “de-prioritization
of patients who are unlikely to benefit from the scarce resource or treatment”).
51. See, e.g., ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., PATIENT CARE
STRATEGIES FOR SCARCE RESOURCE SITUATIONS 6-2 (2020) [hereinafter ALASKA
GUIDELINES],
https://perma.cc/XCJ3-GZWG
(PDF)
(“Re-allocate
ventilator/resource only if patient presenting with respiratory failure has
significantly better chance of survival/benefit as compared to patient currently
receiving ventilation.”); GOVERNOR’S EXPERT EMERGENCY EPIDEMIC RESPONSE
COMM. MED. ADVISORY GRP., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CRISIS STANDARDS OF
CARE FOR HOSPITALS FOR THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 12 (2020) [hereinafter
COLORADO GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/8AKM-4XPJ (PDF) (listing
“[d]uration of mechanical ventilation,” “[t]rajectory of illness,” and “[i]ntensity
of Resource Utilization” as the primary considerations for re-allocation
decisions).
52. ALASKA GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 6-2. Some states apply this
principle more generally but without rigid cutoffs. See MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH,
ALLOCATION OF VENTILATORS & RELATED SCARCE CRITICAL CARE RESOURCES

RATIONING AND DISABILITY

1223

Other states, such as Kentucky, go so far as to use an
anticipated level of resource intensity as a basis to exclude
patients from life-saving care.53
A more common way in which the state protocols ration by
Level of Resource Commitment is with policies that set standard
times by which a patient must show improvement to continue to
use a scarce medical resource. For example, an early version of
the Massachusetts rationing protocol provided that “[p]atients
showing
improvement
will
continue
with
critical
care/ventilation until the next assessment.”54 If there are
patients waiting for a scarce medical resource, some states allow
a resource that is currently in use to be withdrawn from a
patient who has deteriorated or has not improved by the time of
reassessment.55 Most jurisdictions re-evaluate on a regular
basis, but states use different standards of measurement, often
by assigning preset amounts of time (improvement within a
certain number of days) with the allotted time varying
depending upon the priority group the patient is assigned to.56
DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 6 (2020) [hereinafter MINNESOTA
ALLOCATION OF VENTILATORS], https://perma.cc/EC69-UX53 (PDF) (“Patients
who are reliably predicted to need a resource for a substantially greater
amount of time than other patients currently needing the resource may be
deprioritized to allow more patients to have access.”).
53. See KENTUCKY GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 35 (expressly excluding
from hospital and ICU care those patients whose existing chronic condition, or
disability, may cause them to “require a larger-than-normal number of
resources”).
54. MASS. EXEC. OFF. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE, PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
23 (Apr. 2020), https://perma.cc/MEG5-WBUG.
55. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, LETTER TO HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY LEADERS AND COUNTY HEALTH ENTITIES 28–29 (2020) [hereinafter
CALIFORNIA GUIDANCE], https://perma.cc/8A9W-CH69 (PDF) (“[T]he goal of
maximizing the benefit for communities of patients would be jeopardized if
patients who were determined to be unlikely to survive hospitalization were
allowed indefinite use of scarce critical care services.”); MASSACHUSETTS
GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 25–26 (“[T]herapeutic trials may be shorter if the
ability of the hospital to reallocate the ordinary course of critical care is
overwhelmed by the demand for such resources.”); N.J. GUIDELINES, supra note
23, at 2 (“The triage team will conduct periodic reassessments of all patients
receiving ICU/critical care services during times of crises.”).
56. See, e.g., N.Y. VENTILATOR GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 63–67
(criteria for reevaluating patients with different priority levels at 48-hour and
120-hour assessments); S.C. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA ETHICS TASK FORCE, SOUTH
CAROLINA PREPARES FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE 66–69
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We envision two rationales for this policy. First, a patient
who has not improved by the check-in point may be unlikely to
improve at all. If so, continued allocation of the scarce resource
to this patient provides little benefit. While this threshold for
lack of benefit is likely far less demanding than the “futility”
threshold that is used in normal circumstances,57 the basic idea
is similar. Yet, some patients may require longer times with the
resource to achieve the same level of improvement that another
person might achieve with fewer days or hours. In that case it is
not a question of futility, or near futility. Rather, the
reassessment and reallocation approach in the state protocols is
likely grounded by a different and more ethically controversial
rationale. By standardizing the time within which a patient
must improve to continue to have access to the scarce medical
resource, a state is prioritizing those patients who need less time
with scarce medical resources over those who need more.58
We label both types of policies—those governing initial
decision-making and those used for reassessment—as using the
rationing principle of Level of Resource Commitment.59
3.

Principle Three: Life Expectancy

The state approaches differ with regard to whether and how
they consider life expectancy. Some states that previously
rationed on the basis of life expectancy, like Oregon, have now

(2009) [hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA GUIDELINES], https://perma.cc/JWT7RGXQ (PDF) (criteria for reevaluating patients with different priority levels
at 48-hour and 96-hour assessments).
57. See infra Part II.E.1.
58. South Carolina takes just this approach. See SOUTH CAROLINA
GUIDELINES, supra note 56, at 68–69 (using the absence of change in SOFA
score as a criterion for assigning a lower triage priority). When considering
reallocation of a scarce medical resource, some states will reallocate only if a
patient presenting has a “significantly better chance of survival benefit” as
compared with the patient currently receiving ventilation. ALASKA
GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 6-2. These include Alaska and Minnesota. See
id. (allowing re-allocation only when the patient using the ventilator has a
“significant difference in prognosis . . . [c]ompared to other patient(s) requiring
and awaiting external ventilation”); MINNESOTA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at
6-2 (allowing reallocation “only if [the] patient presenting with respiratory
failure has significantly better chance of survival/benefit as compared to [the]
patient currently receiving ventilation”).
59. See supra Part I.A.
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rejected this principle.60 Other states continue to use life
expectancy as a rationing principle in the way they prioritize
care,61 or as a tie-breaking criterion.62
Rationing by life expectancy should not, however, be
confused with age-based rationing, which several states adopt.63
New York, for example, rations based on age by giving priority

60. See OREGON PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 6
[U]se of life expectancy criterion in assessing prognosis or in scoring
(e.g., “life years” or “1 or 5-year mortality assessments”) will also
perpetuate inequities . . . . For this reason, life expectancy as a
criterion in scoring should not be used in decision-making about the
allocation of scarce resources during a public health crisis.
Tennessee and Utah, which were the subject of complaints by disability
advocates about their protocols, also rationed on the basis of Life Expectancy.
Cf. OCR HHS Press Release Tennessee, supra note 10 (providing for all such
policies to be removed); OCR HHS Press Release Utah, supra note 10 (same).
61. Alaska, for example, assigns people with conditions that are likely to
result in death within one to two years a lower priority for care. See ALASKA
GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 6-2 (recommending resource re-allocation when
the patient has a “[h]igh potential for death (SOFA score ≥ 12)”). Some states,
like Oklahoma, consider much longer time frames, such as malignancy in
which death is anticipated in less than ten years. See OKLAHOMA GUIDELINES,
supra note 49, at 13–15 (labeling “[m]alignancy with a <10 year expected
survival” as a “Major Comorbidit[y],” adding two points to Oklahoma’s
multi-principle scoring system).
62. See CALIFORNIA GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 27–28 (resolving “ties” by
giving “[p]atients who do not have a severely limited near-term prognosis for
survival . . . priority over those who are likely to die in the near-term, even if
they survive the acute critical illness”); FLA. BIOETHICS NETWORK, ETHICS
GUIDELINES FOR CRISIS STANDARDS OF CARE IN PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES 14
(2020) [hereinafter FLORIDA GUIDANCE], https://perma.cc/69K5-265K (PDF)
(“Ties within Priorities Groups are adjudicated using individualized
assessment of, first, co-morbidities associated with short-term survival;
second, life cycle; third, healthcare workers and staff.”).
63. See UNIV. OF MD., MARYLAND FRAMEWORK FOR THE ALLOCATION OF
SCARCE LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL RESOURCES IN A CATASTROPHIC PUBLIC
HEALTH EMERGENCY 13 (2017) [hereinafter MARYLAND GUIDELINES],
https://perma.cc/4ELB-AY45 (PDF) (prioritizing allocation of resources by age
where the “highest priority in this scoring system is given to children”). For
states which consider age in a tie situation, see, for example, N.J. GUIDELINES,
supra note 23, at 10–11 (“[L]ife-cycle considerations should be used as a
tiebreaker if there are not enough resources to provide to all patients within a
priority group.”); PENNSYLVANIA GUIDELINES, supra note 40, at 34 (“In the
event that there are ‘ties’ . . . younger individuals receive priority because they
have had the least opportunity to live through life’s stages.”); SOUTH CAROLINA
GUIDELINES, supra note 56, at 30, 71–72 (breaking ties “between patients with
equal SOFA scores” by “prioritizing younger patients”).
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to patients seventeen-years-old or younger over anyone over
seventeen, so long as both patients are in the same category with
regard to their probability of benefit.64 Despite its reference to
age, New York rejects consideration of life expectancy and
expressly considers only “short-term likelihood of survival of the
acute medical episode and is not focused on whether a patient
may survive a given illness or disease in the long-term.”65 The
N.Y. Ventilator Guidelines thus ration based on age but not on
life expectancy. In sum, while prioritizing the young could be
based on a principle of life-expectancy, it need not be as the
young could be prioritized over the old for other reasons.
4.

Principle Four: Quality of Life

None of the state protocols explicitly endorse rationing
based on perceptions of the quality of life of a person with a
disability. Many explicitly reject it.66 For example, the
California Plan cautions that “[t]o ensure non-discrimination
against individuals with disabilities, triage protocols must
either not score individuals based on their quality of life after
treatment, or assess at most how far treatment will return the
patient to their own baseline quality of life.”67 Similarly, the
Illinois Plan states that “an ethical framework does not permit
withholding treatment or prioritizing resources based on one
factor, judgments that some individuals have a higher quality
or value of life than others, or judgments about greater ‘social
value’ in comparison to others.”68 We nevertheless include this
principle in our discussion because considerations regarding the

64. See N.Y. VENTILATOR GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 88–89 (“[W]hen the
patients all have equal (or near equal) likelihoods of survival, . . . young age
[may] play a tie-breaking role in determining whether a patient
receives/continues with ventilator therapy.”).
65. Id. at 34.
66. See, e.g., ILLINOIS GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 6; R.I. GUIDELINES,
supra note 37, at 16 (“[D]isability, . . . perceived social worth, [or] perceived
quality of life . . . must not be considered in making priority determinations.”);
TENNESSEE GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 12 (reiterating that all federal laws
protecting patients with disabilities “remain in effect during an emergency”).
67. CALIFORNIA GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 17.
68. ILLINOIS GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 6.
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Quality of Life of individuals with disabilities may inadvertently
affect how the protocols are actually applied.69
In this section, we outlined how state rationing protocols
employ the four rationing principles we distilled. Before
addressing how the law and ethics might treat each principle,
we provide a brief overview of the legal protections against
discrimination on the basis of disability that governs these
questions.
II.

THE ADA & DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY

In this Part, we address the primary law that protects the
rights of individuals with disabilities, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).70 We begin by setting up the conceptual
distinction between disparate treatment discrimination and
disparate impact discrimination that is relevant in both this law
and in discrimination law more generally.71 While some of the
state protocols explicitly exclude people with particular

69. One issue that is beyond the scope of our analysis but critically
important to the life and safety of a subset of people with disabilities is the
danger that individuals who use ventilators regularly for a pre-existing
condition may have their personal ventilators reallocated to others when they
enter the triage process. Increasingly, states that are revising their protocols
are including explicit protections for chronic ventilation users. See, e.g.,
OREGON PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at 6 (“Patients who are chronically
ventilator-dependent outside of the critical care context should not have their
ventilators withdrawn.”); MINNESOTA ALLOCATION OF VENTILATORS, supra note
52, at 5, https://perma.cc/S6QU-MA8B (PDF) (“Patients who are chronically
ventilator dependent outside of the critical care context will not have their
ventilators withdrawn in order to extend supplies.”). We believe that an
explicit prohibition should be a part of all rationing protocols. People should
not live in fear of having their personal ventilation device taken away,
typically at the expense of their lives, simply because they seek access to
medical care. Fortunately, the OCR resolutions in Tennessee and Utah
expressly prohibit re-allocating the personal ventilation devices away from
chronic ventilation users. See, e.g., OCR HHS Press Release Utah, supra note
10 (incorporating “language stating that hospitals should not re-allocate
personal ventilators brought by a patient to an acute care facility”).
70. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. As previously noted, the
ADA does not apply a lesser standard than required by Section 504. See 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a) (“[N]othing in this Act shall be construed to apply a lesser
standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.”). We focus on the ADA as the most fundamental and far-reaching of
these laws.
71. See infra Part II.A.
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disabilities from care (disparate treatment), the harder cases
are the disparate impact cases we address in this Article, in
which facially neutral policies have a disproportionate negative
impact on a protected group.72 As we explain in Part II.A, each
of the rationing principles is likely to do just this. This section
thus sets up the legal question that must be addressed by
reference to the ADA.
In Part II.B, we provide relevant background on the social
history of discrimination against persons with disabilities that
the ADA seeks to remedy. Part II.C outlines the ADA’s basic
nondiscrimination provisions, paying particular attention to the
way the ADA treats policies and actions that have a disparate
impact on disabled persons, and Part II.D outlines how the ADA
balances considerations of utility and inclusion. In Part II.E, we
turn to case law and administrative agency determinations
addressing scarcity, including the recent OCR resolutions of
complaints lodged by disability rights advocates against the
rationing protocols, themselves. Finally, in Part II.F, we call
attention to the focus in the doctrine on the contrast between
stereotyping and individualized inquiry because this contrast,
while useful, has been over-emphasized in our view, distorting
the picture of what is needed to comply with the ADA’s
insistence on the genuine inclusion of people with disabilities.
A.

Disparate Treatment Versus Disparate Impact

U.S. discrimination law is organized around two distinct
concepts of “discrimination”: disparate treatment and disparate
impact. In disparate treatment cases, the law or policy explicitly
distinguishes between people on the basis of a legally protected
trait and treats people with and without the trait differently.
For example, some state protocols have explicitly excluded
people with specific disabilities from care.73 Disparate impact,
by contrast, addresses laws and policies that do not target
people with a particular trait for different treatment, but
72.
73.

See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., TENN. ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE WORKGROUP, GUIDANCE
ETHICAL ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES DURING A
FOR
THE
COMMUNITY-WIDE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY AS DECLARED BY THE GOVERNOR
OF TENNESSEE, attach. C at 5 (2016), https://perma.cc/RAY8-YCP9 (PDF)
(listing exclusion criteria for hospital admission, including, e.g., “[a]dvanced
untreatable neuromuscular disease”).
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nonetheless affect people differently. In particular, people with
the legally protected trait fare worse under the facially neutral
law than do those without the trait. In such cases,
discrimination statutes, including the ADA, require that this
“disparate impact” be justified.74
Disparate treatment cases are the easy cases. As a result,
it is unsurprising that complaints against such exclusions in
state protocols have already been addressed.75 The disparate
impact cases present the harder cases. The principles with
which we began this Article all reflect policy choices that will, if
applied, have a disparate impact on people with disabilities.
None of these principles explicitly exclude people with
disabilities, yet as we describe below, each is likely to have a
significant adverse impact on the ability of disabled people to
access life-saving treatment.
If people with disabilities have health conditions or
impairments that make them less likely to survive with the
scarce medical resource than non-disabled people, then
Probability of Survival will disfavor the disabled. If people with
disabilities are likely to use a scarce resource for a longer period
than are non-disabled people, then Level of Resource
Commitment will disfavor the disabled. If people with
disabilities are more likely to have lower life-expectancy than
people without disabilities, then Life Expectancy will disfavor
the disabled. Finally, if Quality of Life measures are used to
ration resources, they will disfavor the disabled to the extent
that a life with disability is judged to be of lower quality than
one without a disability.
When we consider all the rationing decisions that health
care providers may face, the net effect is that individuals with
disabilities and members of racial minorities with comorbid
conditions are more likely to be denied access to life-saving care.
Of course, none of these policies will negatively affect all
disabled people. A blind person, for example, may well have the
same probability of survival (all else equal) as a sighted

74. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3).
75. See OCR HHS Press Release Alabama, supra note 10 (challenging
exclusionary criteria in Alabama); OCR HHS Press Release Tennessee, supra
note 10 (challenging exclusionary criteria in Tennessee); OCR HHS Press
Release Utah, supra note 10 (challenging exclusionary criteria in Utah).
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person.76 Nevertheless, such a policy will likely have a disparate
negative impact on people with disabilities because the group of
people harmed by the policy is likely to contain a
disproportionate number of disabled people.
Some scholars argue that this is not the relevant measure
to assess whether a policy produces a disparate impact. For
example, Govind Persad argues that we should focus instead on
whether people with disabilities will benefit from policies that
maximize lives saved.77 If more disabled people have disabilities

76. Despite the intuitive appeal of this example, evidence from one of the
largest mortality studies of COVID-19 shows that people who are blind are
actually at higher risk of mortality from this disease. See Greg Laub, Largest
to Date COVID Mortality Study Released, MEDPAGE TODAY (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3V28-NMLL (“We found that blindness, for example, was an
independent risk factor.”). This finding may result from blind people living
disproportionately in congregate care settings, a known high-risk
environment. See, e.g., Scott D. Landes et al., COVID-19 Case-Fatality
Disparities Among People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities:
Evidence from 12 US Jurisdictions, 14 DISABILITY & HEALTH J. 1, 1–2 (2021)
(determining that the COVID-19 case-fatality and case-mortality rates were
higher for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities [IDD]
living in shared residential spaces, as opposed to individuals with IDD living
on their own or in a family home). Scott Landes and his colleagues’ work on
the disparate impact of COVID-19 on people with developmental and
intellectual disabilities suggests that living in congregate care settings or
receiving 24/7 nursing care likely plays a role. See id. (“[C]ase-fatality rate[s]
remained higher for people with IDD living in residential group homes.”).
But with visual impairments, as with other disabilities, the reasons
may also be more complex. Bodies are integrated wholes and impairments are
not often so segregable. Visual impairments, for example, may stem from or
be exacerbated by co-morbid conditions. See Maria D. Pinazo-Durán et al.,
Ocular Comorbidities and the Relationship Between Eye Diseases and Systemic
Disorders, 2016 BIOMED RSCH. INT’L (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 1 (2016) (noting
concomitant systemic diseases common with visual impairments). The same
is true of many disabilities that initially appear not to involve co-morbidities,
such as autism. See Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Comorbidity Clusters in Autism
Spectrum Disorders: An Electronic Health Record Time-Series Analysis, 133
PEDIATRICS e54, e56 (2014) (outlining common concurrent conditions with
autism). Other disabilities like spinal cord injuries often involve complicating
concurrent health conditions. See Travis E. Marion et al., Previously Identified
Common Post-Injury Adverse Events in Traumatic Spinal Cord
Injury—Validation of Existing Literature and Relation to Selected Potentially
Modifiable Comorbidities: A Prospective Canadian Cohort Study, 34 J.
NEUROTRAUMA 2883, 2883 (2017) (listing comorbidities and complications that
often accompany spinal cord injuries).
77. See Persad, supra note 15, at 41–48 (arguing that this approach
“likely saves more lives among patients with disabilities,” rather than
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that are unlikely to affect their survival than have disabilities
that do diminish their likelihood of survival, then people with
disabilities as a group may be benefited, rather than harmed, by
the policies that aim to maximize lives saved. Persad asserts
that this is the case (or at least that it is plausible) and so
policies that favor saving the most lives will in fact benefit
people with disabilities.78
Persad focuses on a different comparative question than we
do. We ask whether the rationing protocols produce a disparate
negative impact on people with disabilities. When we look at
who benefits and who does not from the adoption of a policy, we
ask whether the percentage of disabled people in the harmed
group is greater than in the population of people seeking care.
Persad focuses on a different question. He asks instead whether
more disabled people are in the group helped by a policy than
the group harmed by the same policy.79
Which is the relevant comparison, legally and morally? The
answer to the legal question is clear. Discrimination law directs
that we focus on whether the group of people negatively affected
by a law or policy contains a disproportionate number of people
from the protected group.80 To see why, consider the following
example. Suppose an employer were considering a policy which
excludes job applicants with a criminal record. If such a policy
produces a disparate impact on racial minorities, it will require
justification under current law.81 While this justification may be
available, that issue isn’t reached unless there is, in fact, a
disparate impact on the basis of race. How should such a
question be addressed? Courts will look at whether applicants
“primarily burdening people with disabilities while primarily benefiting
people without disabilities”).
78. See id. at 17 (finding it “plausible that the people with disabilities who
would be saved only by evidence-based triage outnumber the people with
disabilities in the . . . group who would fare better under random selection or
minimal triage”).
79. Id.
80. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) (finding that
the employer’s testing and educational requirements, which “operated to
render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number” of Black workers, were
“unlawful under Title VII unless shown to be job related”).
81. See id. at 429–31 (establishing that employment policies that are
“discriminatory in operation” must be “shown to be related to job
performance,” otherwise “the practice is prohibited”).
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excluded by the policy are disproportionately racial minorities.82
What Persad’s approach suggests instead is that a court should
assess whether this policy helps more Black individuals
(because they do not have a criminal record) than it hurts
(because they do).83 This is not what the law requires.
Disparate impact analysis under the ADA is no different.
The relevant standard to state a prima facie case is to allege a
disparate impact on individuals with disabilities as compared
with non-disabled persons.84 From a legal perspective, then,
Persad’s focus is on the wrong comparison. Morally, the question
is more complex. Both comparisons matter. The fact that a
policy that saves more lives may also save more disabled lives is
relevant, as is the fact that people with disabilities are likely to

82. See, e.g., id. at 426 (examining whether a policy requiring applicants
to pass a general intelligence test that “operate[s] to disqualify Negroes at a
substantially higher rate than white applicants” is prohibited under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title VII).
83. See Persad, supra note 15, at 29 (arguing that evidence-based triage
is ethical because it “not only saves more lives overall, but it likely saves more
lives among patients with disabilities”).
84. See Femino v. NFA Corp., 274 F. App’x 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2008) (requiring
the plaintiff to demonstrate “a disparate impact on a group
characteristic . . . that falls within the protective ambit of [the ADA]” and then
present evidence showing that similarly-situated individuals with disabilities
are disproportionately affected by the policy in question). Indeed, although the
federal circuits differ in regard to what type or level of evidence is required to
survive under a disparate impact theory, all concur that the relevant measure
is whether the policy disparately affects disabled as compared with
non-disabled persons. See Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 566 (7th
Cir. 2016) (requiring evidence of a “significant disparity between disabled and
non-disabled applicants”); B.C. v. Mount Vernon Sch. Dist., 837 F.3d 152, 162
(2d Cir. 2016) (requiring “significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on
persons of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts
or policies” and measuring disparity in outcome as between persons of that
type and those falling outside the group (internal quotation omitted)). One
wrinkle worth noting however is that, while the comparison we emphasize is
the relevant one to determine whether the plaintiff has set out a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination, courts may consider how many
disabled people are served when determining whether the access provided is
“meaningful” under the standard articulated in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 297 (1985). There, the court determined access was meaningful where
nearly all disabled persons (from the record, more than 95 percent) would be
served. Id. at 303. It did not, however, simply consider that more disabled
benefited than were excluded. Id. at 302–04 (focusing on the number of
disabled individuals that would be served by the program and whether the
“criteria [has] a particular exclusionary effect on the handicapped”).
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comprise a disproportionate share of the group of people harmed
by such a policy. Where we disagree with Persad as a moral
matter is with regard to his contention that the first fact negates
the significance of the second.85 Rather, as we argue below, both
measures matter.86 Lastly, we should note that the factual
premise on which Persad’s argument is based—that more
disabled people will be helped than harmed by prioritizing
saving the most lives—is speculative and difficult to verify.
The disparate impact that each of the rationing principles
generates leads to a question: Are the significant negative
effects on the ability of people with disabilities to access
life-saving treatment likely to outweigh the purported benefit of
each of these rationing principles in the view of the ADA? To
inform our answer to that question, we now turn to the statute
itself, beginning with the history that informed its passage.
B.

Disability Discrimination that Informed the ADA

The ADA’s robust protections of disabled persons respond
to a history of social treatment that ranges from pernicious to
neglectful.87 The specter of eugenics, for example, hovers in
especially unsettling ways over any discussion of medical
rationing and disability.88 Forced sterilization of disabled

85. In Persad’s view, “[a] greater but unequal chance of survival seems
ethically preferable to a smaller but more equal chance.” Persad, supra note
15, at 45. It is precisely this claim that we argue is debatable in Part IV.
86. See infra Part III.
87. Our society has confined individuals with disabilities to institutions,
many of which were and are operated in egregiously substandard conditions.
See generally Emily Johnson, Letter from the Editor: Disability, Medicine, and
Ethics, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 355 (2016). So-called “ugly laws” on the books in
American cities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries expressly
prohibited people with disabilities (those deemed to be “diseased, maimed,
mutilated or in any way deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object
or improper person”) from appearing in public spaces. See generally Adrienne
Phelps Coco, Diseased, Maimed, Mutilated: Categorizations of Disability and
An Ugly Law in Late Nineteenth-Century Chicago, 44 J. SOC. HIST. 23 (2010)
(discussing Chicago law specifically). For the broader history of ugly laws, see
SUSAN SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 63–84 (2009)
(explaining “unsightly beggar ordinances”—laws often used to arrest disabled
people on the street—within the context of disability history).
88. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (upholding the
compulsory sterilization of Carrie Buck under a law permitting forced
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persons by healthcare providers was upheld by the highest court
in the land with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s haunting
determination that “three generations of imbeciles are
enough.”89
In its findings underlying the ADA, Congress recounted the
degree to which disabled individuals have been excluded from
society, often not because of anything inherent to their
conditions, but because of choices society has made about whom
to include or exclude.90 This discrimination was so
wide-reaching as to affect every aspect of life,
including—significantly—discrimination in health services.91
The ADA’s legislative history is replete with testimony about
the barriers people with disabilities face in the healthcare
setting.92
There is also ample evidence that health care providers
possess conscious and unconscious biases related to disability,
and that these biases create barriers to care, contribute to the
provision of substandard services, and lead to poorer health
sterilization for those diagnosed as incompetent and deemed likely to transmit
disability to offspring).
89. Id. at 207.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (“[P]hysical or mental disabilities in no
way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society, yet
many people with physical or mental disabilities have been precluded from
doing so because of discrimination.”).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (“[D]iscrimination against individuals
with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . health services.”).
92. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. E1839–40 (daily ed. June 7, 1990) (statement
of Rep. Steny H. Hoyer) (explaining that under the ADA, doctors’ offices and
other healthcare providers cannot discriminate on the basis of disability and
must ensure full and equal enjoyment of services, facilities, privileges, and
accommodations); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: J. Hearing on S.
2345 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Lab. &
Hum. Res. and the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. &
Lab., 100th Cong. 39–56 (1988) (focusing on discrimination against individuals
with HIV/AIDs); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: J. Hearing on H.R.
2273 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ. & Emp. Opportunities of the H.
Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 101st Cong. 63 (1989) (citing testimony that found
that hearing impaired individuals are “admitted to hospitals, undergo surgery,
and are released without the benefit of a sign language interpreter to receive
information critical to their health”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989:
Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcomm. on Civ. & Const. Rts. of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 264 (1989) (citing consumer surveys on
issues with health care affordability and availability for people with
disabilities).
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outcomes.93 Also important, studies have found that few
healthcare professionals understand their legal obligations to
individuals with disabilities.94
Finally, disability scholars have written about the degree to
which both technocratic and democratic processes have largely
omitted disabled persons, such that views “about them” and the
policies which govern their lives, are largely informed “without
them.”95 One implication of this history is that assessments of
the consequences of disability, including those about the quality
of life people with disabilities enjoy, emerge largely from
nondisabled people.96 Against this background, we should be
especially attentive in assessing whether state rationing
protocols impermissibly discriminate against people with
disabilities.
C.

The ADA’s Non-Discrimination Provisions

The ADA is Congress’s most extensive civil rights
legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The ADA’s purpose
is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination” on the basis of disability.97
Disability, which is to be construed broadly in favor of expansive
93. See Silvia Yee et al., Compounded Disparities: Health Equity at the
Intersection of Disability, Race, and Ethnicity, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF.
FUND 1, 39–47 (2016), https://perma.cc/2F5Q-DUEA (PDF).
94. See Nicole D. Agaronnik et al., Knowledge of Practicing Physicians
About Their Legal Obligations when Caring for Patients with Disability, 38
HEALTH AFFS. 545, 550 (2019) (“[M]ost physician participants exhibited a
superficial or incorrect understanding of their legal responsibilities to patients
with disabilities.”).
95. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk
Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1507–09 (2001) (discussing the Oregon
Health Services Commission “expert” decision to rank “quality of life”
measures that disfavor people with disabilities above public concerns from
community meetings); JAMES CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US 3
(1998) (discussing how the phrase “Nothing about us without us” was re-coined
in the early 1990s as a central expression of the disability rights movement).
For a critique from the community of the ways in which the field of bioethics
specifically has neglected the disability analysis, see this series of government
reports from the National Council on Disability on Bioethics: Bioethics and
Disability Report Series, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, https://perma.cc/Y758FEQ4.
96. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
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coverage,98 is defined functionally “as a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” 99 This breadth of coverage means that individuals
with a considerable range of health conditions are entitled to the
ADA’s protections.100
Virtually all decisionmakers involved in medical rationing
are covered by the ADA. The state and local government actors
that issue, activate, and apply the protocols are covered by Title
II of the ADA.101 Private health care providers who effectuate
rationing are covered as places of public accommodation by Title
III of the ADA.102 Obligations extend to actions taken directly or
through contractual arrangements, so the law also reaches the
actions of corporate health care systems.103
The primary nondiscrimination provision in Title II
provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4); see ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (amending the ADA to include a definition of disability
that “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this
Act, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act”).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The law also covers those having a history of
such an impairment, or who are perceived as having such an impairment. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(B)–(C).
100. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101(b), 36.101(b) (2020) (“[T]he definition of
disability in this part shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage
to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); 154 CONG. REC. S7957 (daily ed. July 31, 2008)
(statement of Sen. Thomas Harkin) (“This bill will make it easier for people
with disabilities to be covered by the ADA because it effectively expands the
definition of disability to include many more major life activities, as well as a
new category of major bodily functions.”).
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165; 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2020). Title II, which
covers state and local government entities, is most closely modeled on Section
504. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 794. Like Section 504, minimal non-discrimination
language is laid out in the statute with the bulk of the specific provisions in
its implementing regulation at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35.
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182–12189; 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (2020). Although we
analyze the state protocols, we are conscious that many decisions will be made
by private actors, who are covered by Title III.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (including “participating in a contractual
or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered
entity’s qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination
prohibited by this subchapter” as prohibited discrimination under the ADA);
see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(1), 35.130(b)(3) (2020) (defining specific
instances in which a public entity may not contractually deny benefits, aid, or
service to individuals with disabilities).
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reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.”104 Title III’s chief mandate requires that people with
disabilities have full and equal enjoyment of an entity’s
services,105 or “an equal opportunity to obtain the same results
as others.”106
Both the ADA and its implementing regulations go on to
define “discrimination on the basis of disability” to include
various acts and omissions:107 those that explicitly discriminate
on the basis of disability, i.e., disparate treatment; and those
disadvantage individuals with disabilities, i.e., disparate impact
discrimination.108 Among the prohibited facially-neutral actions
resulting in disparate impact discrimination are those that
“impose eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out”
individuals with disabilities,109 or that use “standards, criteria,
or methods of administration” which produce a disparate impact
on people with disabilities.110
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A primary difference between Title II and Section
504, on the one hand, and Title III, on the other, is the requirement in Title II
and Section 504 that the individual be a “qualified” person with a disability.
Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). That is, a qualified individual is an individual “who,
with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,” meets
“the essential eligibility requirements” for participation or the receipt of
services. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). For a compelling treatment of the question of
whether someone is qualified in the context of rationing, see Bagenstos, May
Hospitals Withhold Ventilators, supra note 15.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
106. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 55 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 478.
107. For example, the ADA prohibits: denying individuals with disabilities
opportunities to participate, allowing them to benefit on an unequal basis, or
offering opportunities that are separate or different from those offered to
others (unless doing so is necessary to ensure equal treatment). 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iv), 12182(b)(1)(C); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130,
36.201– 204 (listing instances where an act or omission can be considered
discrimination on the basis of disability).
108. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130, 36.201–04 (including specific instances when
acts or omissions are considered discriminatory on the basis of disability); 28
C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, § 36.204 (2020) (stating that § 36.204 incorporates “a
disparate impact standard to ensure the effectiveness of the legislative
mandate to end discrimination”).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2020).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(D); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.204 (2020) (“A
public accommodation shall not, directly or through contractual or other
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Importantly, facially-neutral policies that negatively affect
people with disabilities have been invalidated by the courts
when and because disabled people were unable to get
“meaningful access” to health care services.111 For example, in
Alexander v. Choate,112 a case decided under Section 504, the
Court held that disabled people cannot be denied “meaningful
access” to health benefits, noting that Congress’s intentions
would “ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify
the harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect as
well as by design.”113 Courts have applied this same “meaningful
access” standard to healthcare cases under the ADA,114 as in
Rodde v. Bonta,115 where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit considered a county’s decision to close the one healthcare
facility in the area that provided rehabilitative services.116 The
Rodde court concluded that while “Alexander may allow the
[c]ounty to step down services equally for all who rely on it for
their healthcare needs,” it does not sanction eliminating services
relied on disproportionately by the disabled.117
To recap, the express language of the ADA, its
implementing regulations, and court decisions all forbid
discrimination based on facially-neutral policies or practices
that have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities
without adequate justification. These protections apply to
arrangements, utilize standards or criteria or methods of administration that
have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability, or that perpetuate
the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative
control.”); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, § 36.204 (incorporating the disparate
impact standard).
111. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 297, 302 (1985); Rodde v.
Bonta, 357 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2004).
112. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
113. Id. at 297.
114. See, e.g., Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1484–85 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding that quarantine procedures that applied equally disproportionately
burdened those visually-impaired persons dependent on guide dogs, thereby
denying them “meaningful access” to state services, programs, and activities).
115. 357 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2004).
116. See id. at 998 (“While the disabled could theoretically seek service
from the remaining facilities . . . the services designed for the general
population would not adequately serve the unique needs of the disabled, who
therefore would be effectively denied services that the non-disabled continued
to receive.”).
117. Id. at 997.

RATIONING AND DISABILITY

1239

healthcare, and disabled persons are entitled to meaningful
access to health services.
D.

The ADA’s Balancing Calculus

A central tenet of the ADA is that people do not start on an
equal footing in their ability to benefit from services and that
this inequality is caused, at least in part, by choices society has
made.118 To address these choices—choices which reflect biases
so entrenched in the fabric of our social structure as to be built
into the very physical structures in which we operate—the ADA
imposes a number of remedial duties, or specific affirmative
steps, that covered entities must undertake, ranging from
things like making architectural changes to their facilities119 to
furnishing sign language interpreters.120 The affirmative duty
most relevant to the rationing discussion is a provision similar
to the more familiar “reasonable accommodation” mandate in
employment, which requires entities to make “reasonable
modifications” to their policies, practices, and procedures where
necessary to ensure that their services are accessible.121
These obligations are not absolute. For example, covered
entities are not required to provide sign language interpreters if
doing so would constitute an undue financial or administrative
burden.122 In this sense, the ADA strikes a balance between the

118. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (stating that society has isolated and
segregated individuals with disabilities, leading to discrimination in health
services, and that discrimination “denies people with disabilities the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis”).
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182 (b)(2)(A)(iv), 12183; see also 28 C.F.R.
§§ 35.150– 51 (2020) (stating that public entities must ensure, through facility
construction or redesign if necessary, that their services are readily accessible
to and usable by people with disabilities).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.160(b), 36.303
(2020) (requiring public entities and places of public accommodation to provide
auxiliary aids and services such as interpreters to facilitate communication).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2020) (“A
public accommodation shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when the modifications are necessary to afford goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals
with disabilities”).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.164, 36.303(a)
(2020) (providing that a public entity or accommodation is not required to
provide auxiliary aids or services when they would result in an undue burden).
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values of inclusion and efficiency. But the ADA tilts toward
inclusion. The appropriate measure of undue burden in that
instance is not the cost of providing an interpreter for a medical
appointment versus the amount of money that appointment
generates; rather this cost is measured against the total
financial resources of the entity.123 Similarly, entities are
required to take affirmative steps to ensure equal access for
individuals with disabilities and are excused from doing so only
if they meet a very high bar—if the action would “fundamentally
alter” the services the entity provides.124 In sum, the ADA
imposes affirmative obligations on covered entities to ensure
equal access to health services. In so doing, it balances the
interests of inclusion with efficiency, but places greater weight
on inclusion.
E.

ADA Cases on Healthcare, Scarcity, and Rationing

To assess how courts might approach rationing on the basis
of disability in a time of crisis, in this section we examine near
analogs. But because courts are sometimes reluctant to get into
the details of medical decision-making, we first address the
question of whether rationing decisions are medical
judgments.125 We conclude that they are not. While clinicians
123. See JONATHAN R. MOOK, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS & COMMERCIAL FACILITIES § 3.02 (45th ed. 2021) (stating
that to determine “whether providing a sign language interpreter . . . would
constitute an undue burden” the court must compare “the cost of the
interpretive services and the overall financial resources . . . not the revenue
that may be generated by the patient’s visit alone”); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2020)
(providing factors to measure what constitutes an undue burden, including
overall financial resources of entity and nature and cost of action needed).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). For another example, eligibility criteria
that discriminate may be used if such criteria are deemed necessary to the
services an entity provides. Id. at § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(8),
36.301(a). The classic example of such an eligibility requirement is the ability
of states to screen for vision impairment in issuing driver’s licenses. See 28
C.F.R. pt. 35, app. B, § 35.130 (2020).
125. The reluctance of courts to get involved in medical decision-making
stems largely from so-called “Baby Doe” cases decided under Section 504. The
most significant of these cases is United States v. University Hospital, 729 F.2d
144 (2d Cir. 1984). See id. at 156 (expressing concern about applying Section
504 to the “fluid context” of medical treatment decisions); see also Bowen v.
Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 624–25 (1986) (declining to apply University
Hospital’s reasoning regarding medical judgments in a Baby Doe case).
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apply the protocols using medical criteria, the choices embedded
in those protocols—both the principles informing them and the
algorithms that operationalize them—are policy decisions. In
fact, the state protocols go to great lengths to distance clinicians
from decision-making.126 The application of these protocols is
thus unlikely to be considered an exercise in medical judgment.
Even if a rationing determination was considered medical
judgment, a court is unlikely to defer to that judgment where,
as here, it results in a denial of access to care. In Bragdon v.
Abbott,127 for example, the Supreme Court decisively applied the
ADA to the context of medical judgment,128 rejecting Dr.
Bragdon’s medical determination that an individual with HIV
required treatment in a hospital setting after he declined to
treat her in his office.129 In finding that Dr. Bragdon had
violated the ADA, the court treated his medical judgment as
tantamount to an outright denial of care.130 In sum, rationing
judgments are primarily policy-based and thus subject to
scrutiny under the ADA. Even if they are considered medical
judgments, they are unlikely to receive deference and will
instead be assessed for compliance with the ADA because they
will result in a denial of care.
To assess how a court might approach the protocols under
the ADA, we consider: the reluctance of courts to terminate or
limit use of medical resources by disabled persons when scarcity
is not paramount; the reluctance of administrative agencies to
permit rationing in a non-crisis situation; and the

126. States such as California, Colorado, and Kentucky rely on SOFA
scores to determine resource allocation. See CALIFORNIA GUIDANCE, supra note
55, at 25–26; COLORADO GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 6–7; KENTUCKY
GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 35.
127. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
128. The Court also applied Title II of the ADA to medical decision-making
in the context of a public entity’s decisions regarding provision of mental
health services in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
129. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 651 (“Petitioner failed to present any
objective, medical evidence showing that treating respondent in a hospital
would be safer or more efficient in preventing HIV transmission than
treatment in a well-equipped dental office.”).
130. See id. at 649–50 (concluding that courts should assess the objective
reasonableness of the views of healthcare professionals without deferring to
their individual judgments).

1242

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207 (2021)

administrative resolutions of complaints by disability rights
activists regarding the current triage protocols thus far reached.
1.

Limiting Resources Without Scarcity

Courts and administrative agencies have previously
considered the allocation and limitation of critical medical
resources in non-crisis settings.131 Two features of the law in this
area are potentially relevant. First, while futile care can
generally be denied, decisions regarding futility must be applied
in a similar fashion to disabled and nondisabled patients.132
Indeed, courts have demonstrated reluctance to withdraw
critical, lifesaving resources where disability is a factor.133
Second, the fact that a disabled patient will require more
medical resources is not a legitimate reason to deny them
care.134
Generally, medical resources may be denied when providing
them would be futile, often defined as situations in which the
likelihood of success of a medical intervention is exceedingly
poor.135 Yet, even in cases of extreme futility, courts may be
reluctant to deny life-sustaining treatment like ventilators. In
In re Baby K,136 for example, the court held that a hospital could
131. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(denying an hospital’s request to withhold ventilator treatment from an
anencephalic child); 45 C.F.R. § 84.555(f)(1)(ii)(B) (determining futility is
appropriate to consider in the denial of medical care for Section 504 purposes).
132. See, e.g., Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1028–29 (determining that the
denial of “futile” medical care to an anencephalic baby would result in denial
of medical care on the basis of disability and therefore violate the ADA).
133. See id.
134. See Wagner ex rel. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002,
1017 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding summary judgment improper because a state-run
intermediate care nursing facility could have cared for the plaintiff, who was
“otherwise qualified” for admission, had it made reasonable accommodations).
135. See, e.g., Barber v. Super. Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Ct. App. 1983)
A physician has no duty to continue treatment, once it has proved
to be ineffective. Although there may be a duty to provide
life-sustaining machinery in the immediate aftermath of a
cardio-respiratory arrest, there is no duty to continue its use once
it has become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel.
See generally 3 ALEXANDER M. CAPRON & IRWIN M. BIRNBAUM, TREATISE ON
HEALTH CARE LAW § 18.04(5)(b) (Hooper, Lundy & Bookman, Inc., et al. eds.,
2021).
136.
832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993).
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not deny ventilator services that the hospital deemed had no
therapeutic or palliative purpose to an anencephalic baby,137
when those services would otherwise be provided to a baby
without disabilities.138
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has been
interpreted to require access to care in situations in which a
person’s pre-existing condition will demand an increased
commitment of resources. For example, in Wagner v. Fair Acres
Geriatric Center,139 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
determined that denying someone with Alzheimer’s disease
access to a skilled nursing facility on the basis that she would
require a heightened level of care and resources violated the
law’s basic non-discrimination provisions, which are analogous
to those of the ADA.140 In normal times, courts have been
reluctant to withdraw lifesaving care, even cases of futility
where disability is a factor, and have prohibited consideration of
a person’s likely greater need for resources.
137. See id. at 1038.
138.
The case arose under the ADA, Section 504, and the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), which requires hospitals
to stabilize patients in emergency circumstances which likely also influenced
the outcome. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (stating that a hospital must either
provide medical treatment to stabilize a patient in emergency condition or
transfer the patient to another medical facility).
Generally, tort principles suggest that there is no duty to help
someone, although, in the case of hospitals, EMTALA somewhat alters the
equation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 37 (AM. L. INST. 2012) (stating
that generally, unless an actor shares a special relationship to the harmed
party or the party creating harm to another, the actor has no general duty of
care to rescue or render aid). Under common law it is clear that once one is
providing help, a higher duty accrues. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 324 (AM. L. INST. 1965) (stating that once an actor comes to the aid of another,
the actor assumes liability for any bodily harm caused by the actor’s
withdrawal of aid if the discontinuation leaves the helpless party in a worse
position than when the actor initially intervened). Considerations involving
withdrawal of treatment once a patient is stabilized may be informed by that
duty.
139. 49 F.3d 1002 (3d Cir. 1995).
140. See id. at 1009–11 (finding that while a nursing facility may have
been required to make “reasonable accommodations” to care for a patient with
Alzheimer’s, the patient was “otherwise qualified” for admission, making her
denial on such grounds violative of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). As
noted in supra note 9, the ADA provides that nothing is to apply a lesser
standard than the standards articulated under § 504. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35
(2019) (articulating the specific prohibitions provided under § 504).
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2.

Scarcity Without Crisis

In situations involving scarcity outside of a state of crisis,
administrative agencies have acted to protect the right of
individuals with disabilities to access medical resources and
care. The rationing of organs for transplants provides an apt
example. While courts have not ruled on how the ADA applies
to organ allocation specifically, the reigning assumption from
administrative agency determinations is that the ADA protects
disabled patients from rationing decisions that limit their access
to organs on the basis of their disabilities.141
Administrative agencies have also considered the matter of
healthcare rationing in the context of assessing the level of
health benefits provided by public programs. An example that
has received a good deal of scholarly attention arose in the early
1990s when the State of Oregon applied to the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services for a Medicaid
Waiver under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act.142 At issue
was a novel program to substantially expand the number of
people covered by Medicaid by limiting the services provided.143

141. See, e.g., Press Release, OCR, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
OCR Resolves Disability Complaint of Individual Who Was Denied the
Opportunity for Heart Transplant List Placement (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://perma.cc/54XB-8HJZ (resolving a complaint against the University of
North Carolina Health Care System for denying a person with an intellectual
disability the opportunity to be placed on the United Network for Organ
Sharing); David A. Sylvester, About Face on Organ Transplant, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 13, 1996, at F16 (reporting on the case of Sandra Jensen, a woman with
Down Syndrome who was originally denied a transplant, but became the first
woman with Down Syndrome to receive an organ transplant after the Justice
Department involvement). But see McElroy v. Patient Selection Comm., No.
4:06CV3162, 2007 WL 4180695, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 21, 2007), aff’d, No.
07-3877, 2009 WL 50176, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 2009) (deferring to defendant’s
medical judgment in a pro se case brought by an individual with paranoid
schizophrenia and delusional disorder where the individual was denied an
organ transplant for “legitimate medical reasons”).
142. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Rationing Through Choice: A New Approach to
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J. 1015, 1052–58 (1997)
(examining Oregon’s attempt to incorporate quality of life and life expectancy
metrics into its Medicaid expansion proposal).
143. See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, EVALUATION OF THE OREGON MEDICAID
PROPOSAL 3 (1992), https://perma.cc/H8QL-SS6D (PDF) (“[T]he Medicaid
eligible population would be expanded to include all legal State residents with
incomes below the FPL [Federal Poverty Line]. In contrast, at present, most
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In order to determine which services were covered, Oregon
created a ranked scale prioritizing health care procedures.144 In
effect, this ranking disproportionately excluded people with
disabilities from care due to the way that benefit was assessed.
Then-Secretary Sullivan rejected the Oregon proposal on
the basis that it discriminated against disabled individuals and
thus would violate the ADA.145 His denial was partially based
on evidence in the record that the system was based “in
substantial part on the premise that the value of a life of a
person with a disability is less than the value of a life of a person
without a disability”; a premise which is “inconsistent with the
Americans with Disabilities Act.”146 The Secretary went on to
outline what might be permissible actions under the statute,
such as content neutral factors that do not take disability into
account or—significantly—that do not have “exclusionary
effect[s].”147
To recap, where rationing occurs in the context of scarcity,
administrative agencies appear willing to intervene to protect
individuals with disabilities from discrimination that is explicit,
as well as that which has a disparate impact or exclusionary
effects.
3.

Scarcity in Times of Crisis

The discussion thus far has focused on how courts and
agencies have addressed situations that are analogous to the
issues presented in the crisis standards of care. We now turn to
the resolution of complaints about the current triage protocols
by the Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Health and

people in Oregon must fall into a federally specified need category . . . to
qualify for Medicaid.”).
144. See Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., to Barbara Roberts, Governor of Oregon (Aug. 3, 1992), in ADA
Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 397, 409, 41112
(1994) [hereinafter HHS Analysis of Oregon Health Plan] (discussing Oregon’s
proposed quality-adjustment rating system, which would determine which
treatments Medicaid would cover).
145. See id. at 409.
146. Id. at 410. Sullivan also rejected quality of life data on the grounds
that it was based on stereotypic assumptions. See id.
147. Id. at 411.
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which
has
enforcement
Human
Services
(OCR),148
responsibilities under the ADA, Section 504, and the
nondiscrimination provisions of the Affordable Care Act.149 At
the time of our writing, OCR had resolved three complaints
involving rationing protocols—in Alabama, Tennessee, and
Utah.150 The resolutions are part of a process known as Early
Complaint Resolution, in which OCR provides technical
assistance, but makes no legal finding of liability.151
While they are not legally binding, these resolutions
nevertheless provide a road map for how agencies, and perhaps
future courts, may treat claims of discrimination involving
medical triage in a time of crisis. Each successive OCR
resolution has been more demanding and broader in reach, with
the resolutions in Tennessee and Utah not only addressing
explicit categorical exclusions, but also policies that
disadvantage people with disabilities.152
OCR issued its first resolution on April 8, 2020 in which
Alabama agreed to withdraw its 2010 criteria entirely and,
going forward, not to include provisions that single out people

148. See supra note 10 for a list of complaints lodged during the COVID-19
crisis.
149. See OCR, Laws and Regulations Enforced by OCR, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://perma.cc/A46Y-EZNM (listing the
nondiscrimination regulations and laws that the OCR oversees and enforces).
150. See OCR HHS Press Release Alabama, supra note 10 (stating that
OCR resolved its Alabama compliance review “after the state removed its
ventilator rationing guidelines that allegedly discriminated on the basis of
disability and age”); OCR HHS Press Release Tennessee, supra note 10
(explaining that OCR resolved its Tennessee compliance complaint after
Tennessee revised the criteria in its crisis standards of care plan to prevent
age or disability discrimination); OCR HHS Press Release Utah, supra note 10
(announcing that the OCR resolved its case with Utah after the state amended
its crisis standards of care instructions and protocols).
151. See OCR HHS Press Release Utah, supra note 10 (“ECR [Early
Complaint Resolution] is a voluntary, forward-looking, process where OCR
mediates quick, efficient, and effective resolutions of disputes to the
satisfaction of all the parties without determining legal liability.”).
152. See id. (“[P]roviders may not impose blanket ‘Do Not Resuscitate’
policies for reasons of resource constraint, or require patients to consent to a
particular advanced care planning decision in order to continue to receive
services from a facility.”); OCR HHS Press Release Tennessee, supra note 10
(stating that Tennessee “[c]larified that resource-intensity and duration of
need on the basis of age or disability should not be used as criteria for the
allocation or re-allocation of scarce medical resources.”).
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with certain disabilities for unfavorable treatment in future
Crisis Standards of Care.153 This resolution is a strong
indication that explicit exclusions on the basis of disability that
deny individuals with specified conditions any possibility of
receiving life-saving care are likely to be rejected.
The OCR resolutions reached on June 26, 2020 with
Tennessee and August 20, 2020 with Utah similarly address
explicit exclusions by eliminating them. But they also address
the predictable disparate impact these standards have on the
ability of people with disabilities to gain access to life-saving
care.154 Indeed, both resolutions consider each of the four
rationing principles. They flatly reject rationing based on
Quality of Life and Life Expectancy.155 Both also forbid
consideration of concerns about a person’s likely greater need
for resources or greater duration of need—the principle we call
Level of Resource Commitment—from automatically placing
such individuals at a lower priority for receipt of care and
require that assessments based on Probability of Survival be
accurate and individualized.156 While these OCR resolutions
thus take a strong stand against the first two principles, their
approach to the latter two, and in particular to Probability of
Survival, is more equivocal.
For reasons we address in Part III, these resolutions do not
go as far as they should. These actions depict an agency
wrestling with the precise dilemma we identify. On the one
hand, the agency recognizes that current law forbids policies
that unfairly exclude people with disabilities and, at the same
time, it is loath to force states to forgo policies that will save
more lives.
What is significant is that the OCR resolutions signal that
laws which govern the rights of protected groups remain in full
force even in times of emergency. Indeed, the resolutions

153. See OCR HHS Press Release Alabama, supra note 10.
154. See OCR HHS Press Release Tennessee, supra note 10; OCR HHS
Press Release Utah, supra note 10.
155. See OCR HHS Press Release Utah, supra note 10 (requiring the
removal of life expectancy as a factor in resource allocation, even where
scarce); OCR HHS Press Release Tennessee, supra note 10 (stating that
providers must only factor “imminent mortality” rather than long-term health
and life expectancy when reallocating scarce resources).
156. See, e.g., OCR HHS Press Release Utah, supra note 10.

1248

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207 (2021)

suggest that the law will be applied in much the same way
during times of crisis as in ordinary times.157 The proscription of
reliance on a person’s likely need for more resources, for
example, recalls the decision during ordinary times in Wagner,
where denying a woman placement in a skilled nursing facility
because of her likely heightened need for resources violated
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.158 In addition, like the
Court in Bragdon,159 the OCR resolutions require that medical
determinations be based on “the best available, objective
medical evidence” using an individualized assessment, a key
legal concept which we address in the next section.160
157. In suggesting that the law during times of crisis applies with the same
force as in ordinary times, the OCR resolutions, like the earlier Bulletin OCR
issued, are not unlike decisions by courts. See OCR HHS Bulletin, supra note
11, at 1 (“In this time of emergency, the laudable goal of providing care quickly
and efficiently must be guided by the fundamental principles of fairness,
equality, and compassion that animate our civil rights laws.”). Indeed, this
same reasoning informed the U.S. Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020), a case
challenging COVID-19 restrictions on attendance at religious services as
violating first amendment rights. Id. at 66. The Court noted that “even in a
pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.” Id. at 68.
Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion took this position even more forcefully,
beginning by stating, “Government is not free to disregard the First
Amendment in times of crisis.” Id. at 69 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The
protocols themselves explicitly state that they displace some existing law. See
OCR HHS Bulletin, supra note 11, at 2 (“Some actions or accommodations may
not be required on the basis that they may fundamentally alter the nature of
a program, pose an undue financial and administrative burden, or pose a direct
threat.”). However, what they endeavor to displace is legal liability for
healthcare providers. See id. (explaining that the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act may provide healthcare providers with
some immunity from liability with respect to private claims). They do not, and
indeed cannot, displace their own obligation to comply with federal law. See
id. at 1 (“The Office for Civil Rights enforces Section 1557 of the Affordable
Care Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act which prohibit
discrimination on the basis of disability in HHS funded health programs or
activities. These laws, like other civil rights statutes OCR enforces, remain in
effect.”).
158. See Wagner ex rel. Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002,
1014–16 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that a woman’s status as a “challenging and
demanding patient” could not alone justify her exclusion from a nursing home).
159. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649–50 (1998) (holding that
courts should examine the medical evidence available and assess the “objective
reasonableness of the views of health care professionals without deferring to
their individual judgments”).
160. OCR HHS Bulletin, supra note 11, at 1.
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Stereotyping and Individualized Inquiry

To round off the legal background, we end this section by
looking at the law from a slightly different angle. Rather than
focusing on the statute or analogous case law, we turn to two
important conceptual frames within discrimination law which
play a significant role in ADA cases.
Two concepts animate discrimination law in the United
States: (1) a prohibition on “stereotyping”; and (2) a preference
for “individualized inquiry.”161 The ADA is no exception.162 Each
of these concepts is somewhat elusive and courts are often
unclear about what each prohibits or requires. A stereotype is a
type of generalization.163 But not all generalizations are
stereotypes. For example, some scholars argue that only false
generalizations are stereotypes.164 Others disagree.165 The
concept of “individualized inquiry” is similarly ambiguous.166

161.
For a discussion of the way these ideas animate the constitutional
law of sex discrimination, see Deborah Hellman, Sex, Causation, and
Algorithms: Equal Protection in the Age of Machine Learning, 98 WASH. U. L.
REV. 481 (2020).
162.
The ADA’s direct threat provision, interpreted by the Court in
Bragdon, is instructive. Both the statute and regulation provide for a careful,
individualized assessment, which is a case-by-case inquiry that relies on
objective evidence. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649 (explaining that under the
ADA’s direct threat provision, a health care provider “had the duty to assess
the risk of infection based on the objective, scientific information available to
him and others in his profession”).
163. See Stereotype, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2020) (defining a
stereotype as something “conforming to a fixed or general pattern”).
164. See Lawrence Blum, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis,
33 PHIL. PAPERS 251, 251 (2004) (arguing that “[s]tereotypes are false or
misleading generalizations about groups held in a manner than that renders
them largely, though not entirely, immune to counterevidence,” and finding
stereotypes morally problematic for this reason).
165. See Erin Beeghly, What is a Stereotype? What is Stereotyping?, 30
HYPATIA 675, 675 (2015) (advocating a non-moralized account of stereotyping
according to which not all stereotyping is wrong); Erin Beeghly, What’s Wrong
with Stereotypes? The Falsity Hypothesis, 47 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 33, 33
(2021) (arguing against the view that stereotypes are false generalizations).
166. For an excellent treatment of what individualized inquiry might
mean in equal protection doctrine, see Benjamin Eidelson, Respect,
Individualism, and Colorblindness, 129 YALE L.J. 1600, 1600 (2020) (arguing
that individualized inquiry is best understood not as a prohibition on all
reliance on group-based generalizations, but instead as a requirement that
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For the purposes of this analysis, we put aside the nuances and
complexities, fascinating though they are, and instead stipulate
a definition of each that coheres reasonably well with the way
these concepts are used within the ADA and the cases
interpreting it.
In disability discrimination law, the prohibition on
“stereotyping” does two things. First, it operates to challenge
false generalizations. The classic case that relies on this concept
of a stereotype, School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,167
involved a teacher who had recovered from tuberculosis but was
terminated due to the school board’s fear of the disease.168
There, the Court observed that disability laws are designed to
avoid denials of benefits or services that are rooted in the
“prejudiced attitudes or ignorance of others.”169 Second, and
importantly, the concept of a stereotype is also used to contest
perceptions about disability grounded exclusively in the
perspectives of nondisabled people. In other words, this notion
of a stereotype calls attention to instances where the perspective
of the people without disabilities is used to assess the experience
of living with disabilities, rather than relying on or
incorporating the perspective of people with disabilities
themselves.170 We will use the concept of a “stereotype” to refer
to each of these ideas: a false generalization and a
generalization built around the perspective of the nondisabled
which excludes the perspective of persons with disabilities.
By contrast, the concept of “individualized inquiry” is
invoked to require that a decision-maker refrain from
generalizations about the limitations that a particular disability
might impose when making judgments about the actual abilities
of a person with that disability.171 Instead, the decision-maker
actors respond to members of groups in ways that respect how they have and
continue to exercise their autonomy).
167. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
168. Id. at 276.
169. Id. at 284.
170. See CHARLTON, supra note 95, at 3–21 (discussing the slogan “nothing
about us without us”).
171. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 (concluding that Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act requires an individualized inquiry to protect disabled
individuals from “deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded
fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of grantees
as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks”).
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(an employer, service provider, etc.) must assess the needs and
abilities of the individual at issue in the context of their ability
to use or participate in the relevant service or program.172
One of the named complainants in the OCR complaint
against the rationing protocol adopted in Washington State
provides an apt example of the doctrine of individualized
inquiry.173 Rose was twenty-eight and had cystic fibrosis.174
According to the complaint, a clinician might assume that a
person with cystic fibrosis is likely to have diminished lung
capacity, experience frequent hospitalization and IV antibiotic
use, and have a life expectancy of thirty years.175 Preliminary
data suggest that people with chronic lung disease are at a
higher risk of developing severe illness from COVID-19,176 and
at twenty-eight, Rose may appear to be near the end of her life,
and at heightened risk.177 Yet Rose herself has never been
hospitalized or required use of IV antibiotics and her actual
breathing capacity is greater than that of 70 percent of the
general population.178 Were a hospital to consider Rose’s actual
capacity rather than relying on a generalization about the
172. See, e.g., Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir.
2000) (“In order to properly evaluate a job applicant on the basis of his personal
characteristics, the employer must conduct an individualized inquiry into the
individual’s actual medical condition, and the impact, if any, the condition
might have on that individual’s ability to perform the job in question.”).
173. Letter from Disability Rights Washington, Self Advocates in
Leadership, The Arc of the United States, and Ivanova Smith to Roger
Severino, Director, OCR, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. 2 (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://perma.cc/Z5U3-CB3N (PDF) [hereinafter Letter from Disability Rights
Washington].
174. Id. at 2.
175. See id. at 13 (“Cystic fibrosis is typically perceived as a severe
condition. If a clinician knows only that an adult patient has a diagnosis of
cystic fibrosis, they are likely to make certain assumptions in the absence of a
more detailed medical history.”).
176. CDC COVID-19 Response Team, Preliminary Estimates of the
Prevalence of Selected Underlying Health Conditions Among Patients with
Coronavirus Disease 2019—United States, February 12–March 28, 2020, 69
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 382, 385 (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://perma.cc/PBC7-X72S (PDF) (“Based on preliminary U.S. data, persons
with underlying health conditions such as diabetes mellitus, chronic lung
disease, and cardiovascular disease, appear to be at higher risk for severe
COVID-19-associated disease than persons without these conditions.”).
177. See Letter from Disability Rights Washington, supra note 173, at 13.
178. Id. at 13–14.
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breathing capacity of people with cystic fibrosis, Rose would be
more likely to be offered treatment with a scarce medical
resource like a ventilator.179
The prohibition on stereotyping and mandate of
individualized inquiry will have implications for the
permissibility of the state protocols. The prohibition on
stereotyping prohibits reliance on myths or unsubstantiated
information and instead directs that care should be based on
objective evidence.180 This directive from discrimination law
emphasizes the importance of looking to evidence rather than
anecdote whenever possible, which is an especially important
consideration when information about new diseases is
provisional and evolving. In addition, the prohibition on
stereotyping insists including the perspective of people with
disabilities and is skeptical of judgments about life with
disability that exclude their perspective. This dimension of the
prohibition on stereotyping is likely to be especially relevant
when evaluating rationing principles based on “quality of life.”
The individualized inquiry requirement is also relevant and
beneficial to ensuring access to treatment for people with
disabilities. However, while important, the ameliorative aspects
of individualized inquiry are likely to be modest.181 For this
reason, if courts and others focus only on ensuring
individualized assessment, they risk abandoning the deeper
commitments that underlie the ADA—its insistence on access to
health care for people with disabilities and on a fair balance
between the needs of the community and those of the individual
person with a disability.

179. See id. at 13–14 (“The UWMC’s ‘Material Resource Allocation
Principles and Guidelines’ emphasize maximizing survival. They further
qualify ‘overall survival’ as ‘healthy, long-term survival, recognizing that this
represents weighting the survival of young otherwise healthy patients more
heavily than that of older, chronically debilitated patients.’”).
180. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–86 (1987)
(holding that broadly defined disabilities subject to generalizations and myths
leave a person with a disability vulnerable to discrimination without
individualized, objective review).
181. See, e.g., Letter from Disability Rights Washington, supra note 173,
at 13–14 (emphasizing that Rose would be one of few patients with cystic
fibrosis likely to gain access to lifesaving treatment upon individualized
assessment because she is an outlier patient, experiencing mild symptoms
atypical of an average patient).
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The requirement of individualized inquiry stands to benefit
someone like Rose, the woman described in the OCR complaint
from Washington, who is unlike others with the same disease.182
It is for this reason that disability rights advocates assert that
“[t]o avoid discrimination, doctors or triage teams must perform
a thorough individualized review of each patient and not assume
that any specific diagnosis is determinative of prognosis or
near-term survival without an analysis of current and best
available objective medical evidence and the individual’s ability
to respond to treatment.”183 Note that the complaint is not that
the generalizations about cystic fibrosis (the disease Rose has)
are false; only that they do not apply in her case. For this reason,
individualized inquiry in this context and many others is only
helpful for outliers.
By contrast, people who do fit the generalizations applicable
to their disease or disability will not be helped by individualized
inquiry. The fact that the law requires individualized
assessment does not mean that individualized assessment is
sufficient to meet the requirements of the ADA. Individualized
inquiry is a floor, to be sure, but not a ceiling.
The more difficult question to answer is where that
sufficiency line is. Facially-neutral policies aimed at saving the
most lives will disproportionately disadvantage the ability of
people with disabilities to access life-saving care.184 A
prohibition on stereotyping will weed out inaccurate
generalizations and so will help ensure access when protocols
rely on mistaken views. A demand for individualized inquiry
will ensure that the small number of disabled people who are
unlike others with their disabilities are able to get care. But the
most consequential issues will not be addressed by either of
these demands. In the next section, we turn to each of the four
rationing principles and assess their permissibility, drawing on
all the law canvassed in this section, as well as the moral
principles on which it rests.

182. See id.
183. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L. ET AL., APPLYING HHS’S
GUIDANCE FOR STATES AND HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS ON AVOIDING
DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN TREATMENT RATIONING 1 (2020),
https://perma.cc/7UCT-MJW3 (PDF).
184. See supra Part II.A.
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III. EVALUATING THE RATIONING PRINCIPLES

In this Part, we address the four rationing principles
outlined in the scenarios with which we began this Article and
analyze whether each is legally and morally permissible. Parts
III.A and III.B discuss the easier cases, the rationing principles
based on Quality of Life and Life Expectancy, and argue that
both are inconsistent with the demands of discrimination law
and the moral foundations underlying it. Part III.C turns to the
hard cases, rationing based on Probability of Survival and Level
of Resource Commitment, and argues that an approach that
favors either or both principles without also mitigating the
disparate impact on people with disabilities is unfaithful to the
ADA and not morally justified. The bulk of our discussion
focuses on Probability of Survival and Level of Resource
Commitment, which raise the thorniest legal and moral issues
and thus will benefit most from significant attention. These
principles have attracted less criticism from disability advocates
and scholars than the explicit exclusions and quality of life
measures.185 They also have some ardent and well-regarded
defenders.186
A.

Undervaluing Life with Disability: Quality-of-Life
Considerations

First, we consider a rationing principle based on “quality of
life.” This principle is well-studied and has long been the subject
of controversy.187 In brief, the idea underlying rationing based
on quality of life is that if the same scarce resource can be used
to provide one year of good quality of life versus one year of poor
quality of life, we should use it for the high quality of life rather
than the low quality of life. While this idea may seem plausible
at first blush, it has troubling implications morally and legally.
185. See supra note 15.
186. See, e.g., Persad, supra note 15, at 26 (arguing that COVID-19 policies
were implemented to manage healthcare resource constraints and, in turn,
support that the “two core goals—saving more lives and saving more years of
life—are compatible and consonant with disability law”).
187. See Bagenstos, May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators, supra note 15
(discussing the argument that disability-based criteria likely rest on
potentially erroneous judgments about the life prospects of individuals with
disabilities).

RATIONING AND DISABILITY

1255

Because life years without disability are often judged as more
valuable than life years with disability, the health needs of
people with disabilities typically get lower priority in any
rationing scheme based on quality of life.188
Quality-of-life judgments are flawed and undervalue the
lives of people with disabilities because they rely on stereotypes
and because they are often operationalized in ways that exclude
the input of people with disabilities themselves. A large body of
scholarship demonstrates that life with a disability is not
qualitatively worse than life without a disability.189 Thus, a
quality-of-life-based approach is likely to judge life with
disability as worse due to the misperceptions of nondisabled
people about life with disabilities. In addition, quality-of-life
judgments are often flawed because they rely on the
assessments of nondisabled people and exclude the perspectives
of people with disabilities. To that extent, they are epistemically
partial. Our first objection to this form of rationing is that it
relies on the sort of impermissible stereotypes that the ADA was
designed to redress.190
A second consideration also argues against rationing based
on quality of life. Suppose, for the sake of argument, we
determined that life with disability was qualitatively worse
than life without, and the choice is whether to favor a person
with greater quality of life over a person with a less quality of
life. Suppose also that the reason for this lower quality of life is
social conditions. If life with disability is worse because people
188. See, e.g., John Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, 13 J. MED. 117,
117 (1987) (arguing that using quality adjusted life years fails to treat people
as equals because it disadvantages people whose underlying health conditions
yield a lower quality of life than will a someone with better health and so the
former will lose access to health resources, a form of double jeopardy); see also
supra Part II.E.3 (explaining that Oregon’s Medicare rationing plan
disproportionately excluded individuals with disabilities from care).
189. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARNES, THE MINORITY BODY: A THEORY OF
DISABILITY 71 (2016) (explaining that “there is a vast body of evidence that
suggests that non-disabled people are extraordinarily bad at predicting the
effects of disability on perceived well-being”); Samuel Bagenstos & Margo
Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 745, 749 (2007) (“[P]eople who experience disabling injuries tend to
adapt to their disabilities. To the extent that they experience continuing
hedonic loss, it is physical pain and loss of societal opportunities—not
anything inherent in the disability—that is the major contributor.”).
190. See supra Part II.F.
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with disabilities are treated unjustly, then an approach that
considers quality of life would compound or augment the
disadvantage of the already-disadvantaged person. Individuals
and institutions may have a moral obligation not to compound
prior injustice.191 If the lower quality of life that some disabled
people experience results from societal injustice, then refusing
them life-saving treatment because life with disability yields
fewer quality life years compounds this injustice.
Even if life with disability was worse for reasons unrelated
to unjust social factors, there are still problems with rationing
based on quality of life. Limiting access to care for a person with
a disability because her quality of life from a pre-existing
disability is lower than that of a person without a disability is
cruel. In his influential critique of the use of “quality adjusted
life years,” known as QALYs, John Harris labels that approach
a form of “double jeopardy”:
QALYs dictate that because an individual is unfortunate,
because she has once become a victim of disaster, we are
required to visit upon her a second and perhaps graver
misfortune. The first disaster leaves her with a poor quality
of life and QALYs then require that in virtue of this she be
ruled out as a candidate for life-saving treatment, or at best,
that she be given little or no chance of benefiting from what
little amelioration her condition admits of. Her first disaster
leaves her with a poor quality of life and when she presents
herself for help, along come QALYs and finish her off!192

The use of quality-of-life judgments is most compelling
when an individual person is deciding between two treatments,
each of which offers different quality of life. When the same
approach is used to decide which of two people to treat, however,
then important distributional concerns arise.
To recap, rationing based on quality of life is problematic
because: it typically relies on inaccurate stereotypes; it often
lacks the perspective of disabled people; to the extent poorer
quality of life results from social injustice, it compounds this
191. See Deborah Hellman, Indirect Discrimination and the Duty to Avoid
Compounding Injustice, in FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION LAW
105, 107–09 (Hugh Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan eds., 2018) (arguing that
disparate impact liability may be grounded in a duty to avoid compounding
injustice).
192. Harris, supra note 188, at 120.
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injustice; and it conflicts with moral theories that direct that
inequality is most justified when it benefits the worst off. 193 For
all of these reasons, this rationing principle is the most clearly
prohibited by both the ADA and widely-shared moral
principles.194
Perhaps for these reasons, none of the state protocols
expressly ration based on quality-of-life measures. But
quality-of-life considerations are still important in a discussion
of rationing because perceptions about the quality of life of a
person with a disability may inform decisions in invisible or
invidious ways, especially if they stem from unconscious bias on
the part of decisionmakers.195 Reports in the press have
highlighted instances in which professionals appear to have
rationed care due a perception of the poor quality of life of a
person with a pre-existing disability.196 As discussed in Part II,
there is considerable evidence of conscious and unconscious bias

193. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Nils Holtug, Prioritarianism: A
Response to Critics, 18 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 101, 124 (2019) (defending the view
that the worst-off ought to get priority in the distribution of scarce resources).
194. Other scholars argue that rejecting quality of life measures has
several problems including that “it would sometimes rank one treatment
higher than another, though this would be worse for someone and better for
no one,” but that fixing this problem creates others that are equally bad such
that the task is “like trying to get bubbles out from behind the wallpaper;
pushing down in one place simply moves the bubble elsewhere.” Nick
Beckstead & Toby Ord, Bubbles Under the Wallpaper: Healthcare Rationing
and Discrimination, in BIOETHICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 406, 407 (Helga Kuhse et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2015).
195. See Yee et al., supra note 93, at 138 (concluding that biases and
stereotypes from health care providers concerning people with disabilities
directly contribute to observable differences in health care treatments, thereby
resulting in adverse health outcome for individuals in that group).
196. See Joel Shapiro, As Hospitals Fear Being Overwhelmed by
COVID-19, Do the Disabled Get the Same Access?, NPR (Dec. 14, 2020 3:47
PM) [hereinafter Joel Shapiro], https://perma.cc/JH8L-F2JV (telling the story
of the death of Sarah Sweeney, and alluding to dozens of additional complaints
of discrimination in rationing in Oregon); Kim Roberts, Austin Hospital
Withheld Treatment from Disabled Man Who Contracted Coronavirus, TEXAN
(June 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/DJJ3-8Q7W (detailing the death of Michael
Hickson, a disabled man who was withheld medical treatment from St. David’s
South Austin Medical Center); Ariana Eunjung Cha, Quadriplegic Man’s
Death from Covid-19 Spotlights Questions of Disability, Race and Family,
WASH. POST (July 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/8WAG-UB42 (highlighting
Michael Hickson’s experience).
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on the part of healthcare professionals related to disability.197
To mitigate against the operation of such biases regarding
decisions with life-or-death consequences—decisions which are
often made “behind closed doors”198—we endorse those protocols
which explicitly reject medical rationing based on quality of
life.199 Strong, prohibitory language is necessary to provide some
prophylactic against decisions that may, in fact, be based on
stereotypic assumptions about the value or quality of life of
disabled people: decisions, in other words, that are forbidden by
the ADA.200 Indeed, following the OCR resolutions discussed in
Part II, the revised standards in both Tennessee and Utah both
contain language prohibiting rationing determinations based on
Quality of Life.201
Even prohibitory language, however, may ultimately prove
ineffective in mitigating against biases, especially where those
biases are unconscious or implicit. Additional remedial action
may be required. In Part IV, we recommend an alternative
rationing system that would more effectively mitigate concerns
regarding the role that perceptions of a person’s quality of life
may play in their ability to receive meaningful access to care.
B.

A Fair Share of Life: The Relevance and Irrelevance of Life
Expectancy

The rationing principle we label Life Expectancy would
allocate scarce medical resources based on an assessment of the
number of years a person is expected to live after treatment.202
197. See supra Part II.B.
198. See Joel Shapiro, supra note 196 (analyzing the stories of individuals
who were refused treatment due to their disabilities and subsequently died).
199. See, e.g., ILLINOIS GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 6 (rejecting rationing
based on quality of life); R.I. GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 16 (same);
TENNESSEE GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 12 (same).
200. See supra Part II.
201. See TENNESSEE GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 12 (“[P]ersons with
disabilities should not be denied medical care on the basis of stereotypes,
assessments of quality of life, or judgments about a person’s relative ‘worth’
based on the presence or absence of disabilities or age.”); UTAH GUIDELINES,
supra note 2, at 3 (“[P]ersons with disabilities should not be denied medical
care based on stereotypes, assessments of quality of life, or judgments about a
person’s relative ‘worth’ based on the presence or absence of disabilities or
age.”).
202. See supra Part I.B.
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For this reason, it would generally favor giving resources to the
young over the old.203 However, depending on how it is
employed, it also would disadvantage people with disabilities if
the disability at issue is one for which life expectancy is
generally lower than for the average person.204 This rationing
principle is likely to discriminate not only on the basis of
disability but also on the basis of age. Whether such age-based
discrimination is permissible legally (or morally) raises issues
distinct from those that are our focus and so we note them here
only to draw out the way in which the claims of age-based and
disability-based discrimination differ.205
If age discrimination is morally permissible in the context
of rationing scarce medical resources, the reason is likely to be
that older people have already lived a long life. This fact matters
both because they have at least experienced the good fortune of
long life,206 and have likely already used their fair share of social
resources. For these reasons, it may make sense to favor
someone who has not enjoyed this good fortune (yet) or has not
already consumed their fair share of resources. If the rationale
for favoring the young over the old is something along these
lines, then it would not extend to a young person with a
disability that shortens her life expectancy, as compared with
the average non-disabled person. What matters on this rationale
is age, or perhaps only advanced age, not life expectancy itself.
We stress this point not to argue that favoring children over
203. See supra Part I.B.
204. See supra Part I.B.
205. The bulletin issued by OCR at the start of the current pandemic
underscores that laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age, which
are of more limited scope that those to disability, continue to be in effect even
during a crisis. See OCR HHS Bulletin, supra note 11, at 1 (affirming that,
during the COVID-19, discrimination on the basis of age in health services is
prohibited). For an interesting treatment of the varied approaches to age
discrimination in both statutory and constitutional law and an account of
when they are justified, see Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Age, Time, and
Discrimination, 53 GA. L. REV. 845 (2019) (arguing that age discrimination
does not violate norms of equality in most instances because the fact that
people age means that each person has an equal opportunity of benefit and
harm from age-based restrictions but that age discrimination may violate
non-comparative liberty-based rights).
206. Of course, not all older people have experienced good fortune more
generally. In saying this, we mean only that older people have experienced
good fortune in this domain.

1260

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207 (2021)

older people is morally and legally justified. Rather, our point is
that if this is the reason for such a preference, it would not
extend to disfavoring non-elderly people with disabilities who
have shortened life expectancy.
Rationing based on life-expectancy itself is much more
difficult to defend for two reasons. First, this rationing principle
is likely to negatively affect people with disabilities whose
disability suggests that they are likely to have
shorter-than-average lives. Second, life-expectancy-based
rationing is problematic because it does not attend to the
distribution of the life-years saved. For example, it may be
morally preferable to give two more years to a young person with
a short life expectancy than ten years to an older person.207
We conclude that life expectancy should not be used as a
rationing principle unless the person is very close to death. In
this view, we are not alone.208 According to the American College
of Physicians: “Allocation of treatments must maximize the
number of patients who will recover, not the number of
‘life-years,’ which is inherently biased.”209
However, whenever even near-term life expectancy is used,
the ADA’s focus on individualized inquiry would require that the
life expectancy of each person be assessed directly rather than
relying on generalizations about the life expectancy of people
with particular diseases or disabilities.210 This individualized
assessment will mitigate the disparate impact somewhat. But,
as we argued earlier, if people with particular disabilities really
207. Prioritarian moral theory, which favors prioritizing the least well-off,
would favor such an approach. See, e.g., Adler & Holtug, supra note 193.
208. See Non-Discrimination in the Stewardship and Allocation of
Resources During Health System Catastrophes Including COVID-19, AM.
COLL. OF PHYSICIANS (Mar. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/Y5TW-QMPM (PDF)
(arguing that, in times of medical catastrophe, patient need, effectiveness, and
prognosis must be examined to maximize the number of patients with the
potential to recover).
209. Id.; see Thomas A. Bledsoe et al., Universal Do-Not-Resuscitate
Orders, Social Worth, and Life-Years: Opposing Discriminatory Approaches to
the Allocation of Resources During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Other Health
System Catastrophes, 173 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 230, 230–31 (2020) (arguing
that state guidelines about crisis standards of care and journal articles
promoting a “life-years” approach to rationing, also called a life cycle or fair
innings approach, is unfair because it systematically disfavors older patients,
disabled persons, and potentially other groups).
210. See supra notes 161–172 and accompanying text.
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do have lower life expectancy than people without such
disabilities, reliance on individualized inquiry is unlikely to do
much to cure the serious disparate impact problems that
reliance on life expectancy will produce.211
Perhaps this is the reason that, per the OCR resolutions,
the revised protocols in both Utah and Tennessee have removed
language that previously permitted use of the rationing
principle we call Life Expectancy in the allocation of scarce
medical resources.212
C.

The Hard Cases: Probability of Survival and Level of
Resource Commitment

The Probability of Survival and Level of Resource
Commitment principles present the most difficult cases, and
thus bring the tradeoff we highlight between saving the most
lives and ensuring a fair distribution of harm into the clearest
focus. Each principle will save lives. Probability of Survival will
save lives because it requires that each scarce medical resource
be used on the patients most likely to survive. Level of Resource
Commitment will save lives because more people can be saved
with each resource if the person using it does so for a shorter
period of time. At the same time, both principles will have a
significant disparate impact on the access that people with
disabilities have to life-saving medical treatment.213 As such,
each principle is potentially problematic under the ADA. Both
principles force us to grapple with the difficult question of where
211. See supra notes 181–187 and accompanying text.
212. See Pam Katz, Resolution of Federal Civil Rights Complaint Raises
the Bar in Prohibiting Medical Discrimination Against People with Disabilities
During COVID-19 Pandemic, ARC (June 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/RHM2HKHR (noting that, due to the complaint’s resolution, “Tennessee is now the
first state to explicitly eliminate longer-term survivability as a consideration
in treatment decisions, changing its Guidance to allow medical personnel to
consider only ‘imminence of mortality’”); OCR HHS Press Release Utah, supra
note 10 (noting the removal of “prior language permitting the use of a patient’s
long-term life expectancy as a factor in the allocation and re-allocation of
scarce medical resources”); UTAH GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4, 6 (referring
to “short-term outcomes” and “short-term mortality” risk). Depending upon
how “short-term” is employed in practice, these modifications may comport
with our belief that Life Expectancy should be considered only when death is
very near. See supra notes 208–209 and accompanying text.
213. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
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precisely the ADA draws the line between acceptable and
unacceptable disparate impact.
At the most abstract level, the ADA rests on the bedrock
moral principle that people matter equally and thus are entitled
to be treated in a manner that accords them equal concern and
respect.214 But as we saw in Part II, the ADA instantiates that
principle by adopting a balance between the twin aims of
efficiency and inclusion.215 In order to be true to this pluralist
vision, state rationing protocols should reject a singular focus on
saving the most lives, as some have begun to do, and instead
adopt an approach that balances the pressing need to save the
most lives possible with an equally important focus on how the
benefits and burdens of such an approach will fall.
The first reason that the Crisis Standards of Care should
instantiate a balance between utility and equity, then, is that
the law requires it. From a moral perspective, reasonable people
might disagree about whether policymakers should focus
exclusively on saving the most lives possible or instead should
provide each person with an equal chance of getting access to
life saving treatment, or whether they should adopt some other
plausible rationing principle like prioritizing health care
workers, children, people who have been disadvantaged in some
other domain or something else. That said, the fact that the law
adopts a balance between utility and equity matters morally
because the fact that this is the choice made by democratically
accountable decisionmakers has moral weight.
The balance the ADA strikes between utility and equity is
a compromise between two familiar philosophical views about
when and whether “numbers count.”216 On one view, all else
equal, it is better that to sabe more people than fewer.217 On the
other view, the value of people’s lives cannot be aggregated in
this way.218 Rather, each person’s life has value because of its
value to the person whose life it is. In other words, “[F]ive
individuals each losing his life does not add up to anyone’s
214. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 379–99 (2011)
(articulating a theory of political equality).
215. See supra Part II.D.
216. John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS.
293, 293 (1977).
217. See id. at 294.
218. See id. at 300.
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experiencing a loss five times greater than the loss suffered by
any one of the five.”219 For this reason, each person should be
given an equal chance to survive. This discussion is all very
abstract, so let us illustrate it with an example first proposed by
John Taurek: Island Rescue.
Island Rescue: Your boat is approaching an island on which
there are several people desperately in need of rescue. On the
north side, there are ten people; on the south side there are
five. You only have enough time to go to one side. Should you
go north, because you will save more people; or should you
flip a coin because each of the people matters equally and by
flipping a coin you give each person an equal chance of being
rescued? 220

Both views have something going for them, or at least we
believe so.
Island Rescue is similar in some respects to the famous
Trolley Problem, in which you must decide whether or not to
divert a train heading for a track on which there are five people
to another track on which there is only one person.221 But the
Trolley Problem, about which people also disagree, is
complicated by differences about the moral relevance of doing
something versus allowing it to happen. Island Rescue strips out
this complication and therefore cleanly poses the question of
whether saving more people is clearly better, other things being
equal, than saving fewer.222
219. Id. at 307.
220. Id. at 310–11 (paraphrased from original).
221. The trolley problem was first proposed by Philippa Foot and later
elaborated by Judith Jarvis Thomson. See Philippa Foot, The Problem of
Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5, 6 (1967);
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59
MONIST 204, 206–08 (1976).
222. There is a robust literature on this topic. See, e.g., Taurek, supra note
216, at 310 (arguing that the numbers do not matter and so members of the
larger group and the smaller group have an equal claim on the rescuer to be
saved); T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 234–38 (2000) (offering
a resolution of the dilemma that justifies saving the larger group without
aggregating the interests of each person); Jens Timmermann, The
Individualist Lottery: How People Count But Not Their Numbers, 64 ANALYSIS
106, 111 (2004) (presenting a resolution that values saving more lives and is
modified by a principle that affords members of the smaller group a
proportionate opportunity to be saved); Katharina Berndt Rasmussen, Should
the Probabilities Count?, 159 PHIL. STUD. 205, 214 (2011) (complicating the
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The philosopher Jens Timmermann offers an answer to the
question posed by Island Rescue. He provides a compromise
between the view, on the one hand, that saving more people is
always better and the view, on the other hand, that each person
should have an equal chance of rescue in an approach to the
problem he calls an “individualist lottery.”223 The basic idea is
this. Imagine a wheel divided into fifteen equal segments
representing each person in need of rescue with a space that
accords with her equal worth. Five of these segments represent
the people on the south side, ten represent the people on the
north. You spin the wheel and if it lands on a person on the north
side, you go north. If it lands on a person on the south side, you
go south. The upshot of this approach is that the people on the
north have a two-thirds likelihood of being saved and the people
on the south have a one-third likelihood of rescue.224 This
method thus gives some weight to the fact that more people are
on the north, as they are twice as likely to be saved. But the
people on the south have some chance of survival as well. As
Timmermann explains, “it is rational for the members of a
society not to choose to maximize the probability of being saved”
because “[a] somewhat lower overall probability is the price they
would be willing to pay for their claims never being discounted
right at the beginning.”225 Timmermann justifies this approach
on contractualist grounds226 and also believes that it makes
sense of our “conflicting common-sense intuitions” that numbers
do matter but that individuals matter too.227

analysis by considering the probability of rescue as well as the number of
people to be saved); Gerard Vong, Weighing Up Weighted Lotteries: Scarcity,
Overlap Cases, and Fair Inequalities of Chance, 130 ETHICS 320, 324 (2020)
(discussing how unweighted lotteries cannot handle so-called “overlap cases”
and proposing a novel weighted lottery that can).
223. See Timmermann, supra note 222, at 110.
224. See id. at 110–11 (explaining the Island Rescue hypothetical).
225. Id. at 112.
226. A contractualist moral theory asks, in some form, what policies could
be justified to other people. See SCANLON, supra note 222, at 5 (explaining the
author’s view that “thinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic level,
thinking about what could be justified to others on grounds that they, if
appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject”). See generally JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
227. Timmermann, supra note 222, at 112.
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We offer Timmermann’s individualist lottery to show the
moral appeal of the balance that the ADA strikes between
efficiency and equity, in the abstract. We recognize that not all
readers will share his intuitions or be as drawn to it as we are.
For our purposes, here, it is sufficient that it is a plausible
position with philosophical defenders228 and is the one adopted
by the ADA.229
The argument in favor of balancing saving lives with
ensuring equitable access to care is stronger still when we move
from the world of abstract hypothetical thought experiments to
the real world. The ADA was written, after all, for the world in
which we live.
Rather than ask how one should weigh saving ten people as
compared to saving five, where nothing distinguishes the ten
from the five, the Crisis Standards of Care establish rationing
policies in the actual world in which the people likely to be
disadvantaged are a distinct social group, people with
disabilities, and one that overlaps with other vulnerable groups
like racial minorities.230 In addition, this is a group (like the
groups it overlaps with) that has been disadvantaged in the
past.231 As a result, policymakers should worry that their
willingness to accept negative impacts on disabled people in the
name of saving the most lives possible both is, and will be
perceived to be, infected by a differential sympathy toward those
who are disadvantaged by this policy.232

228.
According to Lara Buchak’s “risk-weighted expected utility
maximization,”
there are actually three psychological components in preference
formation and decision making: how much an individual values
outcomes (utilities), how likely an individual thinks various states
of the world are to obtain (probabilities), and the extent to which an
individual is willing to trade off value in worse scenarios against
value in better scenarios (the risk function).
Lara Buchak, Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance, 127 ETHICS 610, 616
(2017).
229. See supra Part II.D.
230. See supra Part I.B.
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. A concern for such differential sympathy is precisely what led John
Hart Ely to suggest that courts should review legislation that affects discrete
and insular minorities especially closely. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 77–88 (1980) (explaining that prejudice can disrupt the ability of
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This discussion suggests that while rationing based on
either Probability of Survival or Level of Resource Commitment
has something important to be said for it—each principle will
save lives—this benefit must be balanced by another important
aim: ensuring that people with disabilities have equitable access
to care. The ADA itself rests on a balance between two goals,
efficiency and equity, and that commitment survives even in an
emergency.233 As a result, state rationing protocols must forego
a singular focus on saving the most lives and instead adopt a
pluralist approach,234 one which respects both the important
aim of saving as many lives as possible and the equally
important goal of including people with disabilities in a manner
that treats them as equals.
Before we go on to describe how that might be done, we
examine two arguments against the position just advanced.
First, we consider the claim that the Probability of Survival
principle avoids waste and so is more defensible than Level of
Resource Commitment. Second, we consider the claim that the
Level of Resource Commitment principle is not denigrating to the
people it disadvantages and so it is more defensible than
Probability of Survival. Both these arguments attempt to
distinguish between these two rationing principles and thereby
to say that saving the most lives in that way is acceptable while
doing so via the other principle is not. Ultimately, we reject both
arguments and conclude that the two principles are morally
equivalent and thus should be treated similarly.
1.

Avoiding Waste

Perhaps Probability of Survival has a virtue that we haven’t
yet considered: it avoids wasting scarce medical resources.
Waste, in this argument, is defined as a situation in which the
scarce medical resource saves no life.235 Joseph Stramondo offers

majority members to empathize with minority group members and so fail to
represent them).
233. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
234. See Smilansky, supra note 28, for a defense of pluralism in cases of
scarcity and rationing, emphasizing that in these circumstances there are “no
unique, morally best options, although there are wrong ones.” Id. at 460.
235. See Joseph Stramondo, Disability, Likelihood of Survival, and
Inefficiency Amidst Pandemic, BIOETHICS.NET (Apr. 6, 2020, 12:10 PM),
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an argument along these lines. Here’s how that argument goes.
Suppose that we are deciding whether to give the resource to
person A or person B, each of whom is predicted to use the
resource for the same amount of time, but person A is more
likely to survive than person B. If we choose to give the resource
to A (as Probability of Survival dictates), there is less likelihood
that the resource will save no one and thus be wasted.236 This is
a virtue. In Stramondo’s view, this virtue differentiates the
Probability of Survival principle from Level of Resource
Commitment, even though both are similar in prioritizing
saving the most lives possible. To see why, compare that
example to the following one. Suppose we are deciding whether
to give the resource to person C or person D, each of whom has
the same likelihood of survival but one of whom will need to use
the resource for longer. While giving the resource to the person
who will use it for less time could save another life by freeing up
the resource earlier, the chance that the resource will be wasted
by saving no one’s life is the same whichever option we choose
because C and D have the same likelihood of survival. For this
reason, Stramondo favors Probability of Survival as a rationing
principle over Level of Resource Commitment.237
Avoiding waste is surely important and prioritizing
patients with a greater likelihood of survival will ensure that
fewer resources are wasted than if the principle were not
employed. But doing so will not ensure that the particular
resource at issue is not wasted. If patient A has a 30 percent
chance of survival and patient B has a 60 percent chance of
survival, for example, there is a significant chance the resource
will save no one regardless of which patient gets the resource.

https://perma.cc/YWF5-RZEC (explaining that a scenario in which medical
resources are used to save someone’s life is not a “waste” of resources).
236. See id. (explaining the argument that Probability of Survival avoids
medical resource waste); Ari Ne’eman et al., The Treatment of Disability under
Crisis Standards of Care: An Empirical and Normative Analysis, 46 J.
HEALTH, POL., POL’Y & L. 831, 838 (2021) (adopting our schema delineating the
four relevant rationing principles and endorsing Stramondo’s argument that
rationing based on probability of survival is permissible while rationing based
on resource intensity is not).
237. See Stramondo, supra note 235 (“I think we can actually accept the
likelihood of survival criterion while rejecting the level of resource
commitment criterion, even if both aim at maximizing the number of lives
saved.”).

1268

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207 (2021)

Moreover, the fact that this principle wastes fewer resources
overall may just be a way of saying that more lives will be saved.
If so, the argument from avoiding waste does not provide a
reason to favor this principle over Level of Resource
Commitment because implementing that principle will also save
lives and thereby avoid waste.238 Thus, this argument does not
in fact add anything new to the equation. If waste consists in the
fact that use of scarce resources does not yield a life saved, then
avoiding waste is simply another way of describing principles
that save the most lives in the aggregate. For this reason,
avoiding “waste” does not differentiate the Probability of
Survival principle from rationing based on Level of Resource
Commitment.
2.

Avoiding Denigration

Perhaps Level of Resource Commitment is a more attractive
rationing principle than we have thus far recognized because it
does a good job of expressing the equal moral worth of all
potential patients. To see why, consider how the rationale that
underlies each principle might be expressed to the person who
is denied the resource as a result.239 First, Level of Resource
Commitment: We are not giving you this resource because if we
give it to you, you will likely need it for so long that we can save
only one person, but if we give it to someone else who will use it
for less time, we could save four people. Second, Probability of
Survival: We are not giving you this resource because you are
only 30 percent likely to survive and we can give it to another

238. Others share this view, but for different reasons. See, e.g., Eduardo
Rivera-López, Probabilities in Tragic Choices, 20 UTILITAS 323, 331 (2008)
(arguing that choices between saving more people versus fewer people and
between people with higher probabilities of survival versus lesser probabilities
of survival are “at a fundamental level, sufficiently similar,” such that the
same approach should apply to both, which, in the author’s view, is
consequentialist).
239. The idea that we should test principles considering whether they
could be justified to those whom they negatively affect draws on the work of
Tim Scanlon, who describes moral justification as a matter of whether a person
could “reasonably reject” a principle. See SCANLON, supra note 222, at 192 (“In
the contractualist analysis of right and wrong, what is presupposed first and
foremost is the aim of finding principles that others who share this aim could
not reasonably reject.”).
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who is 60 percent likely to survive and thus have a better chance
of saving someone with it.
While in both cases lives will be saved overall by deploying
the principle at issue, Level of Resource Commitment may be
able to express that rationale more directly and so to
communicate that the person denied the resource is denied care
because numbers matter rather than because she doesn’t matter
(or doesn’t matter equally). She is denied access to the scarce
medical resource in order to save more people with that resource
than would be saved if it were allocated to her. In the case of
Probability of Survival, by contrast, the justification of the
principle seems to suggest that one person is less worth saving
than the other. Society says to that person: you are denied care
because giving the resource to another is more likely to save her
life than giving it to you is to save yours. This justification may
seem to suggest that because the other person is more likely to
survive, she is more valuable or more worth saving.
While this argument has some initial appeal and thus
seems to provide an additional reason to favor the Level of
Resource Commitment principle, this seeming reason is
evanescent. While Probability of Survival may initially seem to
value the lives of some more than others, in fact, it values saving
more lives over fewer just as does Level of Resource
Commitment. The person with the greater likelihood of survival
is prioritized not because she matters more but because by
giving the resource to her, more lives will be saved. Both policies
save lives in the aggregate. The similarities between these
principles thus overshadow their differences.
D.

Reasonable Modification: The Law’s Compromise

As detailed in Part II.B, the ADA itself includes a doctrine
that explicitly directs how to balance efficiency and inclusion:
the reasonable modification provision.240 When a policy or
practice of a covered entity would exclude people with
disabilities, the law demands that the entity make “reasonable

240. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (balancing efficiency and inclusion
implicitly by defining discrimination as “a failure to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are
necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to individuals with disabilities”).
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modifications.”241 The term itself contains a nod to each of these
values. Modifications are required to accommodate the needs of
people with disabilities, but only when these modifications are
reasonable, thereby also taking some account of the needs of the
entity and the purpose it serves.242
In what follows, we examine the ways in which this doctrine
has been used thus far in the context of the state rationing
protocols. To preview our evaluation, reasonable modification
doctrine’s prior use has helped to invalidate the clearest
exclusions of people with disabilities and to require some
important changes, but does not yet appear to fully effectuate
the genuine balance of these two important values in the
manner that the ADA requires.
In its resolution of disputes involving state rationing
standards in both Tennessee and Utah, OCR has required
reasonable policy modifications that limit policies grounded in
the rationing principles Level of Resource Commitment and
Probability of Survival.243 From our reading of the press releases
and the revised protocols from both states, the required
modifications are ameliorative, but do not go far enough.
Consider the OCR resolution of a complaint by disability
rights advocates against the protocol in Tennessee.244 At first
blush, the government appears to reject rationing on the basis
of Level of Resource Commitment altogether, asserting in
comprehensive language that “resource-intensity and duration
of need on the basis of age or disability should not be used as
criteria for the allocation or re-allocation of scarce medical
resources.”245 Yet in the next sentence, OCR backs off this strong
241. See id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2019) (“A public accommodation
shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when
the modifications are necessary to afford goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities.”).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring only “reasonable”
modifications, and not requiring such modifications if they would
“fundamentally alter” the nature of the practice).
243. See, e.g., OCR HHS Press Release Tennessee, supra note 10
(explaining that after receiving technical assistance from OCR, Tennessee
updated its plan to clarify that the amount of resources needed or duration of
need should not be considered when allocating resources); OCR HHS Press
Release Utah, supra note 10 (same).
244. See OCR HHS Press Release Tennessee, supra note 10.
245. Id.
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claim with the statement that the goal is to protect people who
“require additional treatment resources due to their age or
disability from automatically being given a lower priority to
receive life-saving care.”246 Taken together, the OCR statements
may only prohibit the reliance on generalizations about the
amount of resources people with particular disabilities will
require and to mandate individualized assessment regarding
whether a patient really will need a high level of resources. If
this reading is correct, the resolution of the Tennessee complaint
represents a modest limitation on this rationing principle. For
people with disabilities in Tennessee who are likely to use a
scarce medical resource for more time than the average
non-disabled person, this modification is unlikely to help.247
On the other hand, OCR’s broad statement rejecting Level
of Resource Commitment as a rationing principle suggests that
a more meaningful application of the reasonable modification
mandate is possible.248 The “reasonable modification” required
by OCR to the protocols in Tennessee and Utah regarding
Probability of Survival as a rationing principle is more clearly
of modest import. OCR stated in a press release that its goal was
to “ensure that people with disabilities are evaluated based on
their actual mortality risk, not disability-related characteristics
unrelated to their likelihood of survival.”249 In other words, OCR
does not appear to object to actual probability of survival after
treatment being used to ration resources; it objects to the
reliance on generalizations about the likelihood of survival of
individual people with disabilities.250 In addition, all
assessments using the SOFA and MSOFA scales are required to
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. Indeed, that the OCR HHS Press Release in Utah omits the word
“automatically” suggests that this more meaningful reading may ultimately
prevail. See OCR HHS Press Release Utah, supra note 10 (“This protects
patients who require additional treatment resources due to their age or
disability from being given a lower priority to receive life-saving care due to
such need.”). Part of the problem of parsing meaning from these documents is
that they are quite brief and exist at a level of generality that obscures a clear
reading of their intention. See id. (providing only an overview of the changes
made in the Revised Guidance).
249. OCR HHS Press Release Utah, supra note 10.
250. See id. (requiring individualized assessment in lieu of “categorical
exclusion”).
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be individualized, but, again, such individualization will
primarily only help people who do not fit these
generalizations.251
We do not want to be overly critical here, nor to dismiss the
importance of this reasonable modification, which will surely
help two groups of people. First, the modifications will help
outliers, those whose experience of a particular disability is
unlike that of many or most people with the same condition.
Second, the modifications will help by prohibiting screening
tools that are unrelated to the aim of saving lives.252 For
example, if the screening tool requires the patient being able to
offer a verbal response, it may be an inaccurate indicator of
survivability for patients who are unable to communicate
verbally.253 But for people with disabilities who really do have a
lower probability of survival than the average non-disabled
person, these modifications are unlikely to be of help.
It is interesting that OCR’s application of the reasonable
modification mandate appears to go further in protecting
against decisions based on Level of Resource Commitment than
in rationing based on Probability of Survival.254 The reason for
this difference may be practical rather than normative.255 The
251. See supra notes 173–184 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., UTAH GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that
modifications are meant to “ensure that disability-related characteristics
unrelated to short-term mortality risk do not worsen the patient’s score”).
253. The revised guidance in Tennessee notes that modifications may be
necessary for people with deafness, or cognitive or mobility impairments, and
elaborates where the SOFA and MSOFA algorithms are described. See
TENNESSEE GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 8, B-5. The guidance offers the
example of the Glasgow Coma Scale, a tool for measuring acute brain injury,
which requires patients to respond verbally and move limbs: “For patients
with pre-existing speech disabilities or disabilities that effect motor
movement, this may result in a higher SOFA score even in instances where
the patient’s disability is not relevant to short-term mortality risk.” Id. at B-5.
254. See, e.g., OCR HHS Press Release Tennessee, supra note 10
(highlighting that a key change in the state guidance “[c]larified that
resource-intensity and duration of need on the basis of age or disability should
not be used as criteria for the allocation or re-allocation of scarce medical
resources”).
255. There is a normative reason that may explain the stronger stance on
Level of Resource Commitment. Because reassessment to decide whether to
withdraw use of the resource from one individual in order to give it to another
is a key aspect of how that rationing principle operates in the protocols, the
stronger stance on Level of Resource Commitment may reflect the difference
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question of how best to remediate the principles that have a
disproportionate impact is, after all, a distinct consideration
from whether the principles are valid.
For example, the revised Utah guidelines call for additional
protections for individuals with disabilities, including
“reasonable modification” to the assessment process for
reallocation.256 It is impossible to know if the reasonable
modification envisioned by Utah is like that in Tennessee, which
serves only to ensure that the SOFA-type tests are applied in a
way that results in an accurate finding of the person’s actual
mortality risk.257 But a more meaningful reading is possible. If
the reasonable modification instead requires that a person with
a pre-existing disability be given more time with a resource in
order to show the same degree of improvement as a
similarly-situated person without a disability, then it would
effectively place the individual with a pre-existing disability on
an equal footing. Such a modification would provide that person
with “an equal opportunity to achieve the same result” as the
ADA requires, and thus alleviate our concern with the Level of
Resource Commitment principle.258 This use of the reasonable
modification provision is familiar because it has been required
by the ADA in other contexts, such as accommodations in testing
that afford extra time to an individual with an intellectual
disability.259
By contrast, it may be more difficult as a practical matter
to envision how to reasonably modify rationing schemes
grounded in Probability of Survival without abandoning the
importance of saving lives. In our view, a reasonable
between withholding care on the one hand, and withdrawing care that is likely
to result in terminating life on the other.
256. See UTAH GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 5, 7 (reasoning that certain
“disability-related characteristics” may be “unrelated to short-term mortality
risk”).
257. Compare UTAH GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 5–7 (specifying
reasonable modifications to be made during assessments), with TENNESSEE
GUIDELINES, supra note 47, at 2, 8 (noting that “a reasonable modification of
SOFA may be a necessary accommodation”).
258. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 55 (1990); see supra Part II.C.
259. See, e.g., Betts v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., No. 97-1850, 1999
WL 739415, at *4 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 1999) (noting that both parties agreed,
pursuant to the ADA, that “allowing [a student] double time on his exams was
a reasonable accommodation”).

1274

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207 (2021)

modification of that principle requires balancing saving the
most lives possible with the importance of treating individuals
with disabilities fairly. In Part IV, we offer a remedial solution
to precisely this problem.
IV. A PLURALIST APPROACH
In this Part, we provide a reasonable modification of the
Probability of Survival Principle. This modification allows both
goals—saving the most lives and ensuring that people with
disabilities get reasonable access to care—to operate. In so
doing, this proposal replaces the singular focus on saving the
most lives possible that currently animates the state protocols
and moves toward a more pluralistic vision.
In the debate about how to ration scarce resources, the
choice is often presented as between saving the most lives
possible or rationing based on a lottery or first-come, first-served
(FC-FS).260 Scholars who favor rationing based on the principle
of FC-FS and lotteries defend these approaches on the grounds
that they accord equal value to each person.261
However, FC-FS and lotteries have drawbacks. Prioritizing
those who arrive at hospitals first risks prioritizing wealthier or
more privileged patients who are more comfortable seeking
medical care or simply have easier access to it.262 And, while we
260. See Mildred Z. Solomon et al., Covid-19 Crisis Triage—Optimizing
Health Outcomes and Disability Rights, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. e27(1), e27(1)
(2020) (arguing that a first-come, first-served approach “would leave many
people with disabilities worse off”). Compare Persad, Evidence-Based Triage
in a Pandemic, supra note 15, at 26 (discussing how it is permissible within
disability law to consider patients’ probability of survival and the quantity of
resources required), with Bagenstos, May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators,
supra note 15, at 4 (suggesting the consideration of various factors or a lottery
system in lieu of a first come-first served system).
261. See Bagenstos, May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators, supra note 15, at
4 (noting that “[e]ven a lottery would be fairer” than the current rationing
protocols); Ari Ne’eman, ‘I Will Not Apologize for My Needs’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2020), https://perma.cc/KAF7-T2UN (“[W]e should maintain a broad
approach of ‘first come first served’ when it comes to lifesaving care, even
scarce medical resources like ventilators.”).
262. See Govind Persad et al., Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical
Interventions, 373 LANCET 423, 424 (2009) (arguing that first-come,
first-served “favours people who are well-off, who become informed, and travel
more quickly, and can queue for interventions without competing for
employment or child-care concerns”).
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appreciate the ways in which a lottery instantiates the equal
worth of all, adoption of this principles goes too far in
abandoning the importance of saving the most lives.
What is missing from the debate, to date, is a proposal that
incorporates both the value of saving the most lives and the
value of inclusion, and explicitly offers an approach that
obviates the need to choose one or the other. Prioritizing saving
the most lives is akin to always going north in the Island Rescue
hypothetical.263 Using a lottery is like flipping a coin. What we
need instead is an approach that approximates the individualist
lottery Timmermann describes: one that accords weight to
saving more lives, while not discounting the claims of the
disabled “right at the beginning.”264
In this Part, we draw upon an innovative approach
proposed by a group of economists that appears to do this. We
offer this approach as a reasonable modification to the
Probability of Survival principle. It will also mitigate concerns
about rationing on the basis of Quality of Life that may occur in
the application of the protocols. This proposal accommodates the
pluralist vision that animates the ADA by allowing both the goal
of saving the most lives and that of ensuring that people with
disabilities get reasonable access to care to operate.
A.

Reserving Resources for Both Efficiency and Equity

A pluralist approach which incorporates both the principle
of saving the most lives (efficiency) and ensuring fair access to
disabled people (equity or inclusion) is most faithful to the
demands of discrimination law and the ADA.265 The technical
challenge is how to accommodate more than one value in a
rationing scheme and to do so in a way that gives each value its
due.
Theoretically, there are several possible methods of
accommodating multiple rationing principles. One way of doing
so would be to adopt a weighted lottery method, which would
assign members of priority groups a higher likelihood of being
selected. As this method seems to mirror Timmermann’s
approach to the Island Rescue problem, it seems initially
263.
264.
265.

See supra notes 223–224 and accompanying text.
Timmerman, supra note 222, at 111–12.
See supra Part II.D.
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appealing.266 While a weighted lottery offers a way to ensure
that disabled people get access, it fails to promote the twin aims
of the pluralist approach in the best manner possible.267 This is
because the method still utilizes a lottery. If people with
disabilities and people with a high likelihood of survival are both
weighted more heavily than people who are not in either of these
categories and then a lottery is used to determine to whom the
resources are allocated, there remains some chance that
resources will be allocated to people in neither category. If so,
this method does not do the best job of achieving the aim of
allocating resources in a manner that advances the values of
saving the most lives possible while ensuring access to people
with disabilities.
A more promising way to operationalize the pluralistic
approach would be to reserve resources for people with
disabilities, while allowing the remainder to be allocated in line
with the principle of saving the most lives possible.268
Specifically, this approach would allocate a percentage of the
scarce resource to the saving lives principle and “reserve” a
percentage for allocation to any other principle or principles
considered relevant, such as ensuring a fair distribution of
benefit and harm.269 A significant advantage of this approach is
its prospective and systemic application. In that sense, it
instantiates the approach taken by the current protocols,

266. See, e.g., Douglas B. White et al., Who Should Receive Life Support
During a Public Health Emergency? Using Ethical Principles to Improve
Allocation Decisions, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 132, 135 (2009) (proposing
that several principles be combined, including “saving the most lives, saving
the most life-years, and giving individuals equal opportunity to live through
life’s stages”).
267. See Joseph Millum, Against Weighted Lotteries for Scarce COVID-19
Treatments, HEALTH AFFS. (Oct. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/278V-B4ZM
(arguing that although weighted lotteries have the appearance of fairness,
they still “lead to unjust outcomes”).
268. See PARAG A. PATHAK ET AL., FAIR ALLOCATION OF VACCINES,
VENTILATORS, AND ANTIVIRAL TREATMENTS: LEAVING NO ETHICAL VALUE BEHIND
IN HEALTH CARE RATIONING 37 (2021), perma.cc/T4UE-5VDF (PDF) (promoting
a reserve system because it “offers additional flexibility to balance competing
objectives”).
269. See id. at 12 (outlining a proposed structure of reserve systems with
no structure for priority orders).
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something especially important when one of the scarce medical
resources is likely to be limited clinician time.270
So how might such an approach work? Economists Pathak,
Sӧnmez, Ünver, and Yemez illustrate such a reserve system
with an example in which the goal is to save the most lives
possible, while at the same time reserving some scarce resources
(in this case, ventilators) for health care workers.271 They
imagine that this reserve for health care workers can be justified
on the basis of either reciprocity (because health care workers
have sacrificed for others, they have earned some preference) or
incentives (if these workers know that they’ll get priority, more
of them will be willing to risk their own health to care for
patients).272 Suppose that a state or society were to endorse
either of these justifications and thus wish to allocate some
priority to health care workers. Without a system like that
proposed by these authors, problems might arise. In particular,
the number of health care workers (especially if that category is
understood expansively, as it frequently is) may exceed the
supply of the scarce resource. As a result, prioritizing health
care workers would require abandoning the goal of saving the
most lives altogether.
Indeed, New York explicitly considered and rejected just
such a priority for health care workers in its rationing protocol
for exactly this reason.273 The committee that drafted the N.Y.
Ventilator Guidelines rejected prioritizing health care workers,
despite their conviction that health care workers should get
some priority, because including that priority would too
dramatically undercut the goal of saving as many lives as

270. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical
Resources in the Time of Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2049, 2050 (“[I]n the
Covid-19 pandemic, the limiting factor for ventilator use will most likely not
be ventilators but healthy respiratory therapists and trained critical care staff
to operate them safely over three shifts every day.”).
271. See PATHAK ET AL., supra note 268, at 12 (proposing a reserve system
that allows for certain groups, such as healthcare workers, to have heightened
priority for treatment). Whether the two principles we discuss should be
supplemented by others, such as privileging health care workers, for example,
is a compelling question. For now, it is worthwhile to highlight that this
system can accommodate a pluralist vision, and one which may incorporate
many principles.
272. Id. at 9.
273. See N.Y. VENTILATOR GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 44–45.
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possible.274 What they lacked, and what is needed, is a
technological solution that allows policymakers to more easily
balance multiple principles, which is something that Pathak et
al. provide.275
The solution is a method that allocates a percentage of the
scarce resource to each of the principles that society determines
should be included.276 As applied to the example above, it
provides a way for a state to limit ex ante the degree to which
the priority for health care workers encroaches on the saving the
most lives principle. If, for example, 80 percent of the scarce
medical resources are allocated toward the saving the most lives
principle, and 20 percent are reserved for health care workers,
the choice to prioritize healthcare workers can only ever affect
20 percent of the scarce medical resources. Simple enough. The
complication arises when members of the groups represented by
different policy choices overlap, with some people being present
in more than one group.277 A central insight of Pathak et al. is
that the order in which the reserves are processed matters, as
we explain below.
The reserve can be operationalized in either of two ways. It
can provide a “boost” for a group, giving it extra resources, as
might be justified in the case for health care workers.278 Or it
can function as a “protective measure” to ensure that members
of a group are not left out altogether.279 The order in which the
reserve category is processed determines whether it functions as
274. See id. at 4 (“The primary goal of the Guidelines is to save the most
lives in an influenza pandemic where there are a limited number of
ventilators. To accomplish this goal, patients for whom ventilator therapy
would most likely be lifesaving are prioritized.”).
275. See Parag A. Pathak et al., Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage
Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 26951) (advocating for a reserve design system to
distribute scarce medical resources during a crisis).
276. See id. at 6–7 (discussing the popularity of the priority system of
allocating resources, where the rank of the principle must be determined).
277. See PATHAK ET AL., supra note 268, at 28 (providing the example of an
individual falling into two priority categories by being considered both
essential personnel and disadvantaged).
278. See, e.g., Pathak et al., supra note 275, at 10 (explaining that “the
later a reserve category is processed the better for its beneficiaries”).
279. See id. (explaining that “if a reserve category is intended as a
‘protective measure’ for a group of participants, then the category should be
processed after more inclusive categories open to all”).
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a boost or a protective measure.280 If the reserve category is
processed first, it functions as a protective measure; if it is
processed second, it functions as a boost. In our view and
consistent with the ADA’s emphasis on equal rather than
superior opportunity, and in the view of Pathak et al.,281 the
reserve for disability should function not as a boost but as a
protective measure.
While a discussion of the mathematics of the reserve system
is beyond the scope of this Article, what is important to
understand is that this model provides an algorithm that
enables policymakers to allocate resources according to multiple
principles—one that can be fashioned in advance and applied
much like the algorithms in SOFA-type scoring.282 For our
purposes, this method provides a middle road between the goals
of saving the most lives and ensuring that benefits and harms
are distributed fairly.
B.

What Legal Issues Does the Reserve Approach Give Rise
To?

One might wonder whether the reserve system we suggest,
in which scarce medical resources are reserved for people with
disabilities, would raise other legal issues. In particular, is such
an approach similar enough to a racial quota to be legally
impermissible?283 After all, the racial quotas that have been
struck down by the Supreme Court involve situations in which
states reserve other scarce resources, like places at colleges or
universities, for members of racial minority groups.284 In this
Section we analyze this legal question and conclude that a
reserve for people with disabilities is likely to be legally
permissible. That said, any uncertainty in this regard can be
avoided by pursuing the goal of ensuring access to individuals
280. Id.
281. See id. at 12 (explaining that “a disabled protective category can be
established for disabled patients reserving some of the units for these groups”).
282. See id. at 12–22 (offering various algorithms with modifiable
components to simulate different reserve possibilities).
283. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)
(holding that the Constitution forbids admitting “specified percentage[s] of a
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin” in higher
education contexts).
284. See id. at 272–73.
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with disabilities or other vulnerable groups with a
facially-neutral policy that focuses more generally on
disadvantage.
A state could adopt the reserve approach we propose in two
different ways. The state protocol might specify that a
percentage of the resources is allocated to saving the most lives
possible and the remainder reserved for people with disabilities.
Alternatively, the protocol might specify that a percentage of
scarce medical resources be reserved for patients who are
disadvantaged, as determined by a recognized index of
disadvantage. We might call the first approach a
disability-based reserve and the second approach a
disadvantage-based reserve.
What legal issues does the disability-based reserve give rise
to? Critics might object that it amounts to a “quota” for people
with disabilities—a word that has come to have strong negative
connotations in the United States.285 That said, thus far only
racial quotas are clearly impermissible under existing
constitutional law.286 By contrast, the Supreme Court treats
disability classifications as non-suspect and thus formally
subject only to rationality review, although the type of
rationality review applied to disability is more searching than
rationality review for economic classifications.287 The rationality
review applied to disability is somewhat harder to pass.288 Still,
even under this more searching standard, a court is likely to find
that a state has a rational interest in reserving resources for
people with disabilities who are otherwise denied a fair shot at
life-saving care. Thus, were a state to allocate X percent of a

285. See, e.g., Louis Menand, The Changing Meaning of Affirmative Action,
NEW YORKER (Jan. 13, 2020), (arguing that people who disapprove of
affirmative action use “the dreaded Q-word, ‘quota,’” thereby supporting our
contention that the word “quota” carries a negative connotation with the
general public).
286. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319–20 (engaging in no discussion on how the
Court’s opinion would impact quotas based on characteristics other than race,
and only ruling that the “explicit racial classification” failed to “promote a
substantial state interest”).
287. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–43
(1985).
288. See id. at 440 (indicating a lower type of rational review for “social or
economic legislation” as opposed to disability laws and assessing the fit
between the alleged purposes of the statute and its means with some rigor).
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scarce medical resource for people most likely to survive, in
accord with the save the most lives principle, and reserve Y
percent of the resources for people with disabilities, in
accordance with the inclusion principle, the policy will likely be
constitutional.
Alternatively, a state could adopt a disadvantage-based
reserve. This approach would allocate X percent of a scarce
medical resource to people most likely to survive, in accord with
the save the most lives principle, and reserve Y percent for
people who qualify as disadvantaged. For example, if 75 percent
of scarce medical resources are allocated based on Probability of
Survival, 25 percent could be reserved for people who are
disadvantaged. This facially-neutral approach is also unlikely to
have any legal liabilities.289
If
both
the
disability-based
reserve
and
the
disadvantage-based reserve are legally permissible, which
should be preferred? There are several practical considerations
that bear on the choice between the disability-based reserve and
the disadvantage-based reserve. The disability-based reserve
may be more straightforward to apply and will more clearly
express that people with disabilities are valued and included in
the distribution of health care in times of emergency. The
disadvantage-based approach, by contrast, has the benefit of
overlap with other disadvantaged groups, especially racial
minorities and the poor.290 Nevertheless, given the breadth of
the definition of disability under the ADA, and the fact that
social and economic disadvantage and poor health often coexist,
there may not be a significant difference between these two

289. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (discussing race,
but noting that a facially neutral law that served goals within the
government’s power would not be invalidated “simply because it may affect a
greater proportion of one [group] than of another”).
290. See, e.g., Andrew Peterson et al., Ethics of Reallocating Ventilators in
the Covid-19 Pandemic, 369 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 2 (2020) (explaining that “[i]n the
US, people of colour have a higher burden of disease ([e.g.], hypertension and
diabetes) than other populations” and that “[s]uch comorbidities can
contribute to poor prognoses in covid-19”). The disadvantage-based reserve
would include those whose underlying medical conditions do not meet the
definition of disability in the ADA.
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approaches in practice.291 If so, the substantial practical
advantage of using disability to define the reserve suggests that
it is preferable.
C.

Reasonable Modification Redux

Earlier we considered whether and how the ADA’s
reasonable modification mandate might help to achieve a
balance between the twin aims of saving the most lives and
ensuring fair treatment to people with disabilities.292 At the
moment, state protocols pursue the goal of saving the most lives
through the rationing principles Level of Resource Commitment
and Probability of Survival.293 We noted that in the most
generous reading of the OCR resolutions, the reasonable
modification doctrine is able to strike a balance between these
two aims when applied to the Level of Resource Commitment
rationing principle.294 State protocols can specify, for example,
that people with disabilities should be afforded more time to
show improvement or greater intensity of resource use before a
resource is reallocated.295 If states employ reasonable
modification in this way to guard against rationing on the basis
of Level of Resource Commitment when allocating and
reallocating resources, the doctrine would go a long way toward
addressing our concerns on this rationing principle.
A reasonable modification of the Probability of Survival
principle requires a more holistic change. Rather than tinkering
with how the principle is applied, the reserve approach requires
that states implement a system that explicitly and at the outset
balances saving the most lives and including people with
disabilities.296 Because the state protocols are all policies
covered by Title II of the ADA, a reasonable modification to

291. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining disability generally as “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities”).
292. See supra Part II.D.
293. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
294. See supra Part III.C–D.
295. See, e.g., supra note 157 and accompanying text.
296. See PATHAK ET AL., supra note 268, at 3 (indicating that in the
proposed reserve system “units are divided into multiple categories” at the
beginning of the divvying up process).
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incorporate a reserve system is a legally viable application of
that doctrine.297
If the reserve approach is to constitute a reasonable
modification of the Probability of Survival Principle, how large
should the disability-based reserve be to be reasonable? We
answer that question in two ways. First, we offer a theoretical
answer. The idea is to balance the twin aims of saving the most
lives and ensuring equal access to people with disabilities. In a
sense, we are looking for a reserve size that is somewhere in
between these poles. It might be helpful then to think about
where these two poles are. On one side is an approach that
endeavors to save the most lives but that uses an approach that
is likely to screen out people with disabilities (full efficiency). On
the other side is an approach that allocates resources to people
with disabilities that is equivalent to their proportion in the
population seeking care (full inclusion). In the latter case, if
people with disabilities, hypothetically, were to make up 25
percent of the population needing the scarce medical resource,
then they would get 25 percent of the available resource. In
theory, a balance between these two principles would reserve
between 0 and 25 percent of the scarce medical resource for
people with disabilities.298
Second, we offer a procedural answer to the question of
what size reserve is reasonable. The ADA sets the basic
parameters, but it does not determine exactly how large the
reserve should be.299 Determining exactly where the balance
between these two aims lies requires a moral assessment that
society as a whole must provide. For that reason, we recommend
that the percentage of the scarce resource to be reserved for
people with disabilities should be determined via a process
involving
community
members
or
by
democratically-accountable decisionmakers or both. In either

297. In the sense that it is a global modification of the protocol, this
reasonable modification would operate more like OCR modifications of the
principle of Life Expectancy, in which the covered jurisdictions removed all
provisions that rationed care on that basis from their protocols. See supra note
212 and accompanying text. Of course, the remedy for Life Expectancy was
more straightforward and easier to effectuate.
298. The 25 percent number was entirely hypothetical and should not be
taken as signifying anything.
299. See supra Part III.D.
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case, people with disabilities and their advocates should be
included in the process.
Finally, the reserve approach will also mitigate against
rationing based on Quality of Life inadvertently affecting
outcomes. The protocols that expressly prohibit rationing on
that basis are helpful, but if the real problem is the implicit
biases of healthcare professionals regarding disability, a
sentence in the protocol stating that decisions should not be
made on this basis is unlikely do much.300 On the other hand, if
professionals applying rationing protocols know that society has
reserved a set of resources for people with disabilities—if
disability is already built into the algorithm that helps
determine who does and does not receive scarce medical
resources—people with disabilities are more assured of access
to care.
In sum, because the reserve approach will mitigate the
disparate impact of explicit rationing based on Probability of
Survival and implicit rationing based on Quality of Life, it
provides an appropriate and ameliorative reasonable
modification of current Crisis Standards of Care.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we evaluated the state protocols that govern
how medical care should be rationed in times of crisis when
there are insufficient medical resources to meet the need. We
began by articulating a problem that lies at the heart of the
current state rationing protocols: their near singular focus on
saving the most lives possible. This important goal, we argued,
must be balanced by the goal of ensuring that harms do not fall
disproportionately on disadvantaged groups like people with
disabilities.
In order to evaluate how the state protocols will result in
the sort of disparate impact on individuals with disabilities that
is forbidden by the ADA and related anti-discrimination laws,
we identified four key rationing principles. Three of the
rationing principles—Life Expectancy, Level of Resource
Commitment, and Probability of Survival—are expressly
reflected in the state Crisis Standards of Care. A fourth

300.

See supra notes 195–201 and accompanying text.
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rationing principle, Quality of Life, remains relevant because it
may inadvertently affect the application of the protocols. The
first contribution of the Article is to articulate the principles
that undergird the state standards in a simple and
straightforward way so that it is easy to evaluate them. The
decision about which principles ought to guide medical rationing
is, after all, one for policymakers and citizens to make, not
scholars.
The second contribution of this Article is to provide a
comprehensive and detailed discussion of the legal and ethical
issues implicated by each principle. While recent resolutions of
complaints about these state protocols by an administrative
agency with responsibility for enforcement of the ADA and
related laws have found these standards deficient, these
resolutions exist at a level of generality that offers little clear
guidance. We hope that this Article’s more detailed exploration
will provide future decisionmakers, be they courts or emergency
preparedness planners and policymakers, with a more refined
understanding of the key moral and legal issues.
In our view, medical providers and policymakers should be
resistant to policies—sensible as saving the most lives may
sound at first blush—that in practice will mean that people with
disabilities will be unable to access life-saving medical care.
Policies that explicitly exclude people with disabilities are easy
to spot and are clearly both legally and morally problematic.
More consequential will be those policies that allocate care
based on Quality of Life, Life Expectancy, Level of Resource
Commitment, and Probability of Survival principles. Each of
these rationing principles will disparately disadvantage people
with disabilities in ways forbidden by the ADA and related
antidiscrimination laws.
We argued that rationing based on Quality of Life and Life
Expectancy are both clearly impermissible. The state protocols
should specifically abjure quality of life judgments and take
steps to guard against such judgments implicitly affecting
rationing determinations. The protocols should also reject
rationing based on life expectancy. While there may be valid
arguments for preferring the young over the old, age-based
preferences should not be operationalized in terms of life
expectancy.
By contrast, rationing based on Level of Resource
Commitment and Probability of Survival present more difficult
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issues. On the one hand, reliance on each of these two principles
will save lives. On the other hand, their use will have a
significant negative impact on the ability of people with
disabilities to access life-saving care. We argued that the ADA
requires a balance between these two values, something that is
missing in most of the state protocols.
We then turned to the separate question of how this deficit
should be remedied, drawing upon the reasonable modification
doctrine in the ADA. We found that policies that rely on Level of
Resource Commitment can be modified by forgoing uniform
benchmarks for determining how long a patient may use a
resource before it is reallocated or how much of the resource she
may use. While many state Crisis Standards of Care still ration
based on Level of Resource Commitment without modifying that
principle to accommodate the needs of patients with disabilities,
some revised state protocols have adopted this change, which we
endorse and commend.301
Modifying rationing protocols based on Probability of
Survival will require more comprehensive change. To
appropriately balance the importance of both saving lives and of
ensuring fair access of people with disabilities to scarce medical
resources, we propose that states specify a percentage of the
scarce resources that is to be allocated in accordance with each
of these principles, as the reserve system we describe permits.
This remedy also helps guard against rationing based on
Quality of Life. The remedy is practical, morally justified, and
most importantly, consistent with existing law.
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed many vulnerabilities
in our planning—gaps in the supply chain, inadequate tracking
systems, and faulty channels of distribution—as crises are
bound to do.302 When the rubber met the road, the
vulnerabilities in our ethical and legal preparedness also
became evident. The Crisis Standards of Care traditionally
focus solely on saving the most lives possible. Amidst the
COVID-19 pandemic, the moral and legal vulnerabilities of that
approach have become clearer. As a result, some states have
301. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., Hans Thalbauer, How COVID-19 Exposed Weaknesses in the
Global Supply Chain, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/D82T-XRDA
(detailing the global supply chain’s reaction to COVID-19 and noting that
“companies and the supply chains were not prepared for a pandemic”).
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modified their plans. While these changes do not go far enough,
they demonstrate that the question of how best to balance the
twin aims of efficiency and equity is important and is one that
policymakers have an appetite to address. It is our hope that the
analysis presented in this Article will inform and affect those
discussions.

